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DEFERENCE AND THE END OF TAX PRACTICE
Mitchell M. Gans*
Editors' Synopsis: The author examines the variousstandardsof deference the courts apply in the case of regulations,revenue rulings and the
government's litigation arguments. The article first focuses on a
generation skipping transfer tax issue to illustrate how the government
recently relied on expanding notions of deference to resolve a conflict in
the circuitcourts-ineffect declaringvictory by regulation. It concludes
with an argumentfor legislation that would reduce the level of deference
the government currently enjoys and that would preclude it from disavowing taxpayer-friendlyrulings or regulations.
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INTRODUCTION

Early in the history of the income tax, the Supreme Court indicated
that when the meaning of tax legislation is uncertain, taxpayers ought to
receive the benefit of the doubt.' Fifteen years later the Court retreated
from this position, concluding that the function of the courts is to determine the meaning of ambiguous legislation and that this function should be
performed without giving either party a presumptive advantage The
Court has now come full circle, except that instead of granting a preference
to taxpayers in the case of uncertainty, 3 it grants a preference to the government under the guise of deference-whether to a regulation,4 a revenue
ISee United States v. Merriam, 263 U.S. 179, 188 (1923) ("If the words are doubtful,
the doubt must be resolved against the government and in favor of the taxpayer.").
2 See White v. United States, 305 U.S. 281, 292 (1938)
(We are not impressed by the argument that, as the question here decided is
doubtful, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the taxpayer. It is the function
and duty of courts to resolve doubts. We know of no reason why that function
should be abdicated in a tax case more than in any other where the rights of
suitors turn on the construction of a statute and it is our duty to decide what that
construction fairly should be.).
Recently, however, Justice Thomas, in a concurring opinion not joined by any other member of the Court, cited Merriam and alluded to a traditional canon of construction that
ambiguous tax legislation or regulations should be read against the government. See United Dominion Indus., Inc. v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 1934, 1944 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring). Although Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion, acknowledged this tradition
(see id. at 1945) neither he nor Justice Thomas mentioned that the Court in White subsequently abandoned the position it had taken inMerriam.
3A court occasionally will entertain the possibility of giving the taxpayer the benefit
of the doubt based on reliance concerns. See, e.g., Peterson Marital Trust v. Comm'r, 78
F.3d 795, 800 (2d Cir. 1996) (indicating that it might be inappropriate to give effect to a
post-transaction tax regulation when taxpayers consummate the transaction based on their
own reasonable resolution of an ambiguous provision in the Code). But see Smiley v.
Citibank (South Dakota), 517 U.S. 735, 744 n.3 (1996) (indicating, in a nontax context, to
disregard a post-transaction regulation in interpreting an ambiguous statute would be
inappropriate).
4 he government's advantage over the taxpayer in the case of regulations is not new
in that their validity had traditionally been reviewed deferentially, but the level of deference

WINTER 2002

Deference and the End of Tax Practice 733

ruling, or perhaps even an argument made by the government during litigation.'
Recent developments, particularly in the transfer-tax area, suggest this
transformation has not been lost on the government. Part I of the Article
sets the stage for a discussion of deference in the tax context by focusing
on a recently litigated generation-skipping-tax issue that resulted in a
conflict in the circuit courts.' Rather than taking the traditional route of
continuing to litigate in other circuits or seeking Supreme Court review,
the government resolved the issue in its favor by promulgating an amendment to the regulations The government issued the amendment approximately fourteen years after the enactment of the underlying statute, after
the government had secured a victory in one circuit by persuading the court
to uphold the original regulations partly because Congress had ratified
them, and after the issue already had been resolved against the government
in another circuit. In effect, the government declared victory by its own
regulation.
Under the traditional view, the adoption of regulations only after the
outbreak of litigation or the failure to adopt regulations contemporaneously
with the enactment of the statute to which they relate would have cut
against deference. The deference formulation now used by the courts
makes these considerations irrelevant. Under the Supreme Court's Chevron doctrine, the agencies are permitted to resolve questions of statutory

the regulations now receive, as well as the wide circumstances in which deference is granted, makes the contemporary notion of deference with regard to regulations a radically
different phenomenon. For a discussion of this transformation, see infra Part II.
5 Deference aside, in some contexts, the government may enjoy a presumptive advantage over taxpayers. For example, in INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992),
the Court referenced the rule that deductions are a matter of "legislative grace," and that the
taxpayer therefore has the burden of clearly establishing that the deduction is justified.
Additionally, Justice Breyer recently argued, in his dissent, that, when the Code is ambiguous, it should be construed so as to avoid creating a loophole. See Gitlitz v. Comm'r, 531
U.S. 206, 222 (2001). See also United Dominion, 121 S. Ct. at 1944-45 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (Justice Stevens intimating that he, too, would resolve ambiguity in order to
defeat taxpayer abuse). Indeed, some have suggested that Congress should enact legislation
to provide that, when the Code is unambiguous and a literal application would favor the
taxpayer, a construction favoring the government would nevertheless be appropriate ifabuse
would otherwise result. See Alan Gunn, The Use and Misuse ofAntiabuse Rules: Lessons
From the PartnershipAntiabuse Regulations,54 SMU L. REV. 159, 162-63 (2001).
6 See Peterson,78 F.3d at 795; Simpson v. U.S., 183 F.3d 812 (8th Cir.1999).
7 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1, 64 Fed. Reg. 62997 (Nov. 18, 1999).
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ambiguity, and the courts are required to defer to any reasonable resolution
on the theory that, unlike the courts, the agencies are politically accountable.8
In a 1996 nontax case, the Court invoked Chevron and deferred to an
agency interpretation issued approximately one hundred years after the
enactment of the statute and after litigation in the lower courts had produced conflicting decisions about the meaning of the statute. And, in a
1997 transfer-tax case, a four-Justice plurality opinion suggested that the
court's conclusion could be overturned by new regulations, even though
Congress had enacted the statute some fifty years earlier (and the government issued such regulations in 2000).9 The Court's deference formulation
even permits government agencies to modify their interpretations over time
if the modification is justified, with various Justices intimating that a
change in administration might provide sufficient justification. Under this
evolving approach, statutes no longer have a fixed meaning. Instead,
statutory content can change as the administration, or the philosophy of the
agencies, changes. Part II examines and critiques the new deference formulation.
Part ImI of the Article revisits the generation-skipping-tax issue examined in Part I. It considers whether the regulations issued by the government in the aftermath of the inter-circuit conflict can be sustained, given
the government's successful argument that Congress ratified the original
regulations under the so-called reenactment doctrine. Even under the
expansive conception of deference currently in vogue, it is possible that
regulations cannot be altered once Congress has approved them. Part M
also examines the relationship between deference and the reenactment
doctrine, raising the question of whether newly issued generation-skipping
tax regulations are valid.
Although the Supreme Court has not spoken as definitively about the
level of deference that revenue rulings are entitled to receive, recent developments suggest that the Chevron framework does not apply in this context. Instead, it appears, a more flexible type of deference is to be applied
depending upon a variety of factors that would be irrelevant under Chevron. So, for example, whereas a ruling designed to influence the outcome
8See

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
9 See Estate of Hubert v. Comm'r, 520 U.S. 93 (1997). For the non-tax case, see
Smiley, 517 U.S. at 735.
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of pending litigation would probably receive little, or no, deference, a
regulation issued in the same circumstances would, in all likelihood, be
binding on the courts (assuming it otherwise satisfied Chevron's criteria).
At the same time, the government enjoys a different kind of deference that
is more analogous to Chevron 's framework where a regulation is ambiguous. In this context, a ruling, or perhaps even a government argument
made during litigation, that resolves the ambiguity in a reasonable manner
may be entitled to Chevron-type binding deference. Part IV of this Article
examines the evolving standards of deference applicable to rulings, and
Part V considers the issue in the context of interpretations offered by the
government with regard to ambiguous regulations.
While, as suggested, the deference standard will differ depending upon
the kind of interpretation invoked by the government, the transformation in
deference has a theme that cuts across all of the standards. In each case,
the law appears to be developing in the direction of granting the government more deference. This is not surprising given Chevron'sbasic insight:
the agencies' political accountability makes them a more appropriate repository for interpretive responsibility than the courts. In the tax context,
the transformation portends the end of practice as traditionally understood.
If the government can declare victory by regulation, the balance between
the government and the taxpayer has been radically changed.
Part VI of the Article argues for a return to the traditional view, under
which the government would receive a reduced level of deference. More
specifically, it recommends that Chevron should not apply in tax cases.
This is not to suggest that the government should receive no deference in
the case of a regulation. Rather, the courts should be permitted to take into
account various factors when determining the validity of a regulation, such
as whether the government issued a regulation contemporaneously with the
enactment of the statute or issued it in the heat of litigation. On the other
hand, revenue rulings and government-proffered interpretations ofambiguous regulations should receive no deference.
Part VI also considers taxpayer-friendly regulations and rulings. The
courts have indicated that, as a matter of constitutional law, a government
interpretation deemed inconsistent with the statute must be disregarded
when it favors the taxpayer. Because of the unfairness and inefficiency of
this approach, Part VI suggests legislation that would circumvent this
constitutional limitation by denying funds to the government for the enforcement of any court decision invalidating a taxpayer-friendly interpreta-
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tion.
PART I. GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX: HISTORY,
BACKGROUND, AND NEW REGULATIONS

A. History and Background
In 1976, Congress created the generation-skipping transfer tax
("GST"'). ° Sensitive to concerns about wealth transfers made in reliance
on preexisting law, Congress provided grandfather protection for previously created irrevocable trusts (i.e., for trusts that were irrevocable on
June 11, 1976)." In 1986, Congress repealed the GST, making the repeal
retroactive to the date of the original enactment. 2 Congress simultaneously created a new GST, similar in some respects to its predecessor but
critically different in other respects. The new GST also grandfathered preenactment irrevocable trusts (in this case, trusts that were irrevocable on
September 25, 1985). 13 The grandfather provision in both versions of the
GST tax was subject to an exception: the GST would be applicable to a
preexisting trust to the extent of any post-enactment addition to the trust.14
In 1980, the Department of the Treasury ("Treasury") finalized the
effective-date regulations under the 1976 legislation. 5 In the preamble to
the regulations, the Treasury discussed comments it had received regarding
preexisting trusts that contain powers of appointment. 6 The commentators
had argued that transfers occurring as a result of the exercise or lapse of a
power should be grandfathered because the exception from the grandfather
provision for post-enactment additions to a trust contemplated additions
from outside sources."' The Treasury rejected this argument. Citing to the
Conference Report and pointing to the structure of the statute, the Treasury
articulated Congress' rationale for grandfather protection and the exception for additions: to exclude from tax any transfer that could not be un10

See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2006, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. (90

Stat. 1520) 1879-90 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 2601-2662 (2001)).
" See id. at 1889.
12 See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1431, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 100
Stat. 2085, 2717-32 (1986).
13
See id. at 2731.
14 See Tax Reform Act of 1976 § 2006, 90 Stat. at 1889; Tax Reform Act of 1986
§ 1433, 100 Stat. at 2731.
15 See T.D. 7713, 1980-2 C.B. 283, 285.
16 See id.
17
See id.
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done at the time of enactment (in other words, not to violate reliance interests).'" The regulations invoked traditional estate and gift tax principles to
implement this concept. Thus, under the regulations, an addition to the
trust would not be viewed as occurring unless a taxable transfer (under
either the estate or gift tax) had been made.' 9
Applying this concept in the context of powers of appointment, the
regulations contain a constructive-addition provision.2" Accordingly,
transfers occurring as a result of the post-enactment lapse or exercise of a
special power of appointment-not being a taxable event under traditional
estate and gift tax principles-would not be subject to the GST.2 1
However, referencing the 1976 legislative history, the Treasury observed
that Congress explicitly indicated its intention to make the post-enactment
exercise of a special power under a pre-enactment trust subject to the GST
if exercised in a manner that violates a federalized version of the rule
against perpetuities.22 Based on this observation, the Treasury qualified
the constructive-addition provision, providing that transfers made under an
exercise of a special power of appointment in violation of a federalized
perpetuities rule would be subject to the GST.23

When Congress adopted the new version of the generation skipping tax
in 1986, it explicitly focused on the regulation containing the constructiveaddition provision.24 In both the House and Senate, the conclusion was
18

See id.

19See id.

See id. at 288 (citing Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(e)(3) (1980)).
See id.
22
Congress obviously was concerned about taxpayers abusively prolonging the duraat 288-89.
tion of preexisting trusts and thereby indefinitely avoiding the tax. See id.
23 See id. at 288.
24 Inthe House, Representative Rostenkowski (who introduced the bill), referenced the
regulation under the 1976 legislation and described an agreement providing that the scope
of the new effective-date provision would be given the same interpretation. See 132 Cong.
Rec. H8362 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1986). In the Senate, Senators Bentsen and Packwood, by
way of colloquy, explicitly adopted the same agreement. See 132 Cong. Rec. S 13952 (daily
ed. Sept. 27, 1986). See also PetersonMarital Trust, 78 F.3d at 801, (citing government
arguments that the legislative history established that Congress had given the regulation an
overall endorsement and that Congress should therefore sustain the regulation under the
1986 legislation. In upholding the regulation, the court stated: "There is, if anything, some
indication in the legislative history of the 1986 GST that the legislature considered the
effective-date provision to be as interpreted in Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(e)(3)."). See also
Gen. Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 99th Cong. 1267 n. 12 (1987) (Statement
of J. Comm. on Taxation); Brief for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue at 28-30, Peter20
21
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reached that the regulation accurately captured Congress' intent underlying
the 1976 legislation.2 5 It was agreed, moreover, that the provision should
be ratified and remain viable under the new version of the tax.26 Thus,
Congress, in 1986, clearly embraced the notion that an addition would
render grandfather protection unavailable only where a taxable transfer
under the estate or gift tax provisions occurred (subject to the same qualification contained in the 1980 regulations regarding the exercise of a special
power of appointment beyond a federalized perpetuities period).27
B. Conflict in the Circuit Courts
In Peterson,8 the husband had created an irrevocable trust prior to the
enactment of the 1986 version of the GST.29 Under the trust, the wife had
a testamentary general power of appointment." If she failed to exercise
the power, the corpus would remain in the trust for the benefit of the
grandchildren, except for the portion necessary to pay the estate tax attributable to the inclusion of the corpus in the wife's estate.3' In 1987, the
wife died without having exercised the power.32 The Internal Revenue
Service ("Service") took the position that the lapse of the wife's power of
appointment upon her death constituted a constructive addition to the trust,
thereby making grandfather protection unavailable.33
The Service argued that one of the examples in the then temporary
regulations illustrating the constructive-addition provision was directly on
point.34 In the example, the post-enactment lapse of a general power of
appointment created under a pre-enactment trust negated grandfather
protection.3 5 The parties agreed that if the constructive-addition regulation
were valid, the lapse of the power subjected the transfer to the GST.36
Arguing against the validity of the regulation, the taxpayer made the same
son (No. 95-4001).
See Tax Reform Act of 1976 § 2006.
See id.
27 see id.
28 78 F.3d at 795.
29
See id. at 797.
30 see id.
31 See id.
32 See id.
33 See id. at 798.
34
See id.at 798-99.
35 See id.
36 See id. at 798.
25

26
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argument that the Treasury had rejected in the 1980 preamble to the regulations under the 1976 legislation: the addition concept contained in the
statute contemplated transactions having the effect of increasing the
amount of trust corpus. a7 The Service argued that the regulation was a
reasonable construction of the statute and that it could not be invalidated
given that "the regulation received an overall endorsement" by Congress in
1986.8
After reviewing the history of the regulation, the Petersoncourt agreed
with the Service.39 The court first considered the 1980 preamble, in which
the Treasury explained that a constructive addition would be deemed to
occur only if a transfer taxable for estate or gift tax purposes were made.4
The court concluded that the Treasury's decision in 1980 to ground the
statutory concept of an addition in traditional transfer tax theory was ap' against the backdrop of
propriate.4 Congress had used the term "added"42
the provisions in the Code and regulations that define a taxable transfer,
and, therefore, must have intended to give the term content based on these
provisions. Because the lapse of a general power of appointment is a
taxable event under either the estate43 or gift" tax, the court could have
ruled for the Service on this basis and ended its analysis. The Court, however, chose not to do so. Instead, the court concluded that, Congress did

7 See id. at 800.
38

See Brief for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue at 28-30, Peterson (No. 95-

4 00 1 p. 30 .

See Peterson,78 F.3d at 800.
40 See id.; Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

463 U.S. 29, 46-51 (1983) (noting that the Court examined the administrative record to
determine if the agency's decision to revoke its interpretation was arbitrary or capricious).
See also Estate of Harrison v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 161 (2000) (examining preamble to
determine the intent underlying the regulation); Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent:
The Placefora "LegislativeHistory" ofAgency Rules, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 255, 291 (2000)
(indicating that courts typically do not give serious consideration to regulatory history, but
arguing that such material should receive more attention).
4-See Peterson, 78 F.3d at 800.
42 The effective-date provision, as set forth in the legislation, is as follows: the
GST
will not apply to "any generation-skipping transfer under a trust which was irrevocable on
September 25, 1985, but only to the extent that such transfer is not made out of corpus
added to the trust after September 25, 1985." Tax Reform Act of 1986 § 1433, 100 Stat. at
2731.
43 See I.R.C. § 2041.
44 See I.R.C. § 2514.
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not disclose any intent to overrule the regulation.4 5 Indeed, according to the
Court, the legislative history revealed what the Service had argued-that
Congress intended to ratify the regulation and to adopt it as the governing
construction of the effective-date provision under the 1986 legislation, thus
immunizing the regulation from the taxpayer's attack on its validity. 6
The court also reached the same conclusion as the Treasury in its
analysis of the statute. The court read the statute as making grandfather
protection available when the family cannot escape from the terms of
transfer contained in the trust.4 7 Because Mrs. Peterson could exercise her
power of appointment to undo the transfer made by her husband, the court
determined that the statute required denial of grandfather protection.4"
In Simpson v. United States,49 the facts were similar to those in Peterson. Unlike Mrs. Peterson, however, Mrs. Simpson did not allow her
general power of appointment to lapse. Instead, she exercised it in favor of
her grandchildren, which resulted in an outright distribution of the trust
corpus to them upon her death. 0 Not surprisingly, the Service relied
heavily on Peterson. The Simpson court, however, found the factual differences between the cases warranted a different outcome given the language of the then-temporary constructive-addition regulation.5 Under the
regulation, a constructive addition occurred "where any portion of a trust
remains in the trust after the release, exercise, or lapse of a [general] power
of appointment.... . 52 Whereas in Peterson,the trust corpus remained in
the trust after the lapse of Mrs. Peterson's power, none of the corpus remained in the Simpson trust after Mrs. Simpson exercised her power.3 In
other words, as perceived by the Simpson court, the critical condition in the
regulation, which was satisfied in Peterson but not in Simpson, was the
requirement that the corpus remain in the trust after the exercise or lapse of
the power.54
45 See Peterson, 78 F.3d at 801.
46
47 See id. at 801 n.5.
See id. at 801-02.
48 See id.

49 183 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 1999).
50 See id. at 815-16.
51See id. at 816.
52

Id. at 815 (quoting Temp. Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(1)(v)(A) (1988)) (alteration

in original).
See id. at 815-16.
54 See id.
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The Simpson court's analysis of the regulation reveals a weakness in
its drafting. Under the Simpson court's reading, in order to defeat grandfather protection, there must be a release, exercise, or lapse of a general
power of appointment;55 and trust corpus thereafter remaining in the trust.56
Although the text of the regulation easily lent itself to this reading, the
1980 preamble strongly suggested that the Treasury intended otherwise.
The preamble implied that the exercise, release, or lapse of a general
power-being a taxable event under either the estate or gift tax-would be
sufficient to defeat grandfather protection (without regard to whether the
57 5 8
trust corpus remained in the trust ).
What accounts for this apparent conflict between the regulation and
the preamble? The preamble revealed the Treasury's policy-based impulse
to make the availability of grandfather protection turn on taxability under
the estate and gift tax. 9 The preamble explicitly offered two policy justifications for making such taxability determinative. First, where the corpus
of a trust becomes the subject of a taxable event, the beneficiaries can alter
or undo the terms of the initial transfer.' Second, introducing a rule that
failed to parallel estate and gift tax principles would be inappropriate.6 '
The regulation's text, on the other hand, disclosed a language-based concern that the statute might not be able to accommodate a construction
focusing solely on taxability, because, ordinarily, the word "addition"
contemplates an increase or augmentation.6 2
The Treasury apparently sought to resolve this conflict between the
regulations and preamble by adopting a fiction: if the corpus remained in
the trust after the exercise, release, or lapse, it could be viewed as if the
trustee distributed the corpus to the beneficiaries who then recontributed
the corpus to the trust, thus effecting an increase in the trust corpus.63 This
fiction, however, has its difficulties. Consider the difference between a
lapse and an exercise. An exercise ordinarily entails a direction that the
55 See id. at 815.
56

See id at 815-16.

51 See T.D. 7713, 1980-2 C.B. 283, 285.
58

The conflict could be resolved by reading the preamble as making a taxable event a
necessity,
but not sufficient condition to defeat grandfather protection.
59
See T.D. 7713.
60 See id. at 284-85.

61 See id.
62 See id. at 287-88.
63

See id. at 288.
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trustee make immediate distribution." In contrast, a lapse typically results
in the trustee retaining the corpus.65 While invoking the fiction in the case
of a lapse is relatively easy (given that after the lapse, the corpus remains
in the hands of the trustee), how to apply the fiction when the power is
exercised and, as a result, the corpus immediately leaves the trustee's
hands is unclear.
Although the text of the regulation clearly contemplated that a constructive addition could occur in connection with an exercise, the only
relevant example contained in the regulations involved a lapse.' The
drafters provided no guidance with regard to how the constructive-addition
concept might apply to an exercise. Faced with this lacuna, the Simpson
court distinguished Peterson as a lapse case and upheld the grandfather
protection based on its reading of the temporary regulation's text.67
The court's decision in Simpson, however, ultimately is not satisfying.
The court fails to reconcile its reading of the regulation with the language
in the regulation indicating that an exercise could create a constructive
addition. The court also fails to explain the inconsistency between its
reading of the regulation and the preamble. In addition, in emphasizing the
text of the regulation, the court fails to appreciate the consequences in
policy terms. The differentiation between an exercise and a lapse, a distinction long ago abandoned in the estate and gift tax context, makes no
sense. 6' Put simply, it seems wrong to tax the Peterson family more harshly than the Simpson family merely because Mrs. Peterson's advisers recommended that she allow her power to lapse in favor of her grandchildren
rather than exercise it.
The Simpson court was not satisfied with its regulation-based distinction, concluding that the statute itself clearly called for the result the court
reached.69 Although the Simpson court did not acknowledge the conflict
created with the Peterson decision, the court did reject implicitly Peter6 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATvE TRANSFERS
65

See Peterson, 78 F.3d at 799.

§ 11.1 (1984).

66 See T.D. 7713.
67
See Simpson, 183 F.3d at 815-16.
68 In the case of a general power of appointment created before October 22, 1942, a
lapse is not a taxable event. See I.R.C. §§ 2041(a)(1), 2514(a). But, of course, if created
subsequently, a lapse does trigger either the estate tax or the gift tax. See I.R.C.
§§ 2041(a)(2), 2514(b).
69
See Simpson, 183 F.3d at 816.
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son 's holding that the question of grandfather protection should turn on
whether a taxable transfer under the estate and gift tax provisions has
occurred.70 Contrary to the Simpson court's holding, under the Peterson
court's taxable-transfer analysis, Mrs. Simpson's exercise of her general
power of appointment, a taxable event for estate tax purposes, 7' would
have precluded grandfather protection.
C. New Regulations
Obviously disappointed with the defeat in Simpson, the Treasury issued new regulations overruling Simpson and reaffirming Peterson.72 In
the preamble to the proposed regulations, the Treasury explicitly discussed
the conflict between these decisions and stated its preference for Peterson.73 Surprisingly, however, the regulations do not remain faithful to the
taxable-transfer theory; the Treasury did not even acknowledge that the
Peterson court had concluded that the theory, as adopted by the Treasury
in 1980 and later endorsed by Congress' ratification in 1986, "would ensure that the GST was given the scope intended by Congress. ' 74 In the
preamble to the final regulations, the Treasury rejected commentators'
suggestions to make the regulations consistent with the theory. 75 As will
now be discussed, the Treasury's decision to disavow the theory is crucial
in terms of another aspect of grandfather protection addressed in these
regulations.
The other aspect of grandfather protection deals with a technique
developed after the 1986 legislation to stretch out the term of
grandfathered trusts. The technique is part of an emerging pattern: lawyers seeking to achieve their clients' tax-planning objectives by prevailing
upon state legislatures to enact provisions that will facilitate federal tax

70

If one views Petersonas establishing that a taxable transfer is a necessary but not a

sufficient condition for denying grandfather protection, then Simpson could be understood
as accepting Peterson's taxable-transfer theory and permitting the trust created by
Mr. Simpson to remain grandfathered because a taxable transfer, by itself, is not a sufficient
ground for denying grandfather protection. Nevertheless, that the Peterson decision nowhere suggests that grandfather protection can be retained once a beneficiary has made a
taxable transfer should be emphasized.
71See I.R.C. § 2041.
72 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1, 64 Fed. Reg. 62997 (Nov. 18, 1999).
71 See id. at 62999.
74 See Peterson, 78 F.3d at 800.
75
See T.D. 8912 2001-5 C.B. 452.
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savings.76 This technique requires state legislation that authorizes trustees
who have a power to invade corpus to make the invasion in further trust.
As previously indicated, when Congress enacted the 1986 version of
the GST, it embraced the provision in the regulations under the 1976 legislation applicable to powers of appointment. Thus, subject to the perpetuities limitation already discussed, a donee of a power could extend a pre1986 trust containing a special power of appointment, without causing a
loss of grandfather protection, if the donee of the power exercised it by
creating a new trust with a longer duration. As a result, estate planners
began to suggest that such powers be exercised in this manner in order to
maximize transfer-tax savings.77
However, when a pre-existing trust did not contain a power contemplating the creation of a new trust, how the trust's term could be extended
was not immediately clear. Ultimately, the estate planning community
fashioned a solution: secure state legislation authorizing trustees with a
power to invade under the instrument to make the invasion in further trust,
even if the instrument did not explicitly contemplate the creation of a new
trust. 78 Because a trustee's invasion power is a type of special power, 9 the
theory was that trustees could, under such state legislation, exercise the
power by creating new trusts with extended terms without losing grandfather protection (provided that no violation of the federalized perpetuities
provision occurred).80 This legislation would have a retroactive character

76 See Mitchell M. Gans, Federal Transfer Taxation and the Role ofState Law: Does
the MaritalDeduction Strike the ProperBalance?, 48 EMORY L.J. 871,877-83 (1999). See
also Ira Mark Bloom, The GST Tax Tail is Killing the Rule Against Perpetuities,87 TAX

NOTES 569 (April 24, 2000) (discussing recent state legislation repealing or modifying the
rule ahainst perpetuities in order to create a favorable tax outcome).
See Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuitiesand the GST
Tax: New Perilsfor Practitionersand New Opportunities, 30 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.

(1995).
185, 205-09
78
See, e.g., N.Y.

EST. POWERS &TRUSTS § 10-6.6 (1982).
79 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS §

11.1 (1984).
When Congress enacted the GST in 1986, a background principle provided that a
trustee's discretionary invasion power constituted a special power of appointment. See id.
Accordingly, one can argue that Congress contemplated that a trustee's invasion in further
trust would be viewed as an exercise of a special power that would not trigger a loss of
grandfather protection (assuming the exercise/invasion did not violate the federalized
perpetuities rule). See Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 70 (1995) (referring to the Restatement
of Torts as a background principle in construing a statutory term). On the other hand, at the
time of the 1980 adoption of the regulation under the 1976 legislation, the background
80
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if it was to have the desired effect: it would apply to trusts previously
created.
Understandably, the Treasury found this technique offensive and
adopted an approach in the new regulations designed to close it down."'
Under the regulations, the distribution to a new trust constitutes a modification that could result in a forfeiture of grandfather protection: 2 modifications defeat grandfather protection if vesting is deferred or any beneficial
interest is shifted to a lower generation. 3 In other words, the regulations
will not tolerate a tax-saving invasion in further trust (i.e., an invasion
having the effect ofprolonging grandfather protection). However, this new
modification rule does not apply if the original trust or state law in effect
at the time the trust became irrevocable explicitly authorized the trustee to
make distribution in further trust without the consent of the beneficiaries
or the court" (though the terms of the new trust cannot violate the federalized perpetuities rule and still retain grandfather protection)., 5
Parenthetically, the regulations impose a rather draconian penalty
where an invasion in further trust is treated as a disqualifying modification.
The new trust is not entitled to grandfather protection, and the old trust
loses its protection as well. The loss of grandfather protection is triggered
even if the new trust is created by a partial invasion of, say, one dollar of
the old trust's corpus. 6 By creating such a penalty, Treasury has created
an in terroremeffect. Taxpayers inclined to make such an invasion will be
intimidated from doing so once they realize that, if the regulations are
sustained, it will result in the loss of all grandfather protection.
The Treasury could not continue to adhere to the taxable-transfer
theory while, at the same time, closing down the invasion-in-further-trust
technique. Under the taxable-transfer theory, a trustee's invasion in further

principle was apparently contrary. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 318 (1940)
(suggesting that the Treasury may not have anticipated in 1980 that granting grandfather
protection for the exercise of a special power of appointment would extend to a trustee's
invasion in further trust).
81 See T.D. 8912, 2001-5 C.B. 452.
'2
8

See Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1 (b)(4)(i)(D)(1) (2000).

3 See id.

Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(4)(i)(A)(1).
5See Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1 (b)(4)(i)(A)(2).
86 See Carol A. Harrington et al., Trust ModificationsProp. Regs. and Other Significant GST Tax Developments, 92 J.TAX'N 212, 213 (2000).
84 See
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trust, not a taxable event for estate or gift tax purposes, 7 would not defeat
grandfather protection. Moreover, given the policy justification the Treasury proffered when it originally adopted the theory in the regulations
under the 1976 legislation-that grandfather protection should remain
intact if the family cannot alter or undo the plan8 8-the technique should
not result in a loss of grandfather protection because the family cannot
overrule a trustee's decision to create a new trust with a longer term if state
law, whenever enacted, authorizes it. Thus, to eliminate the technique, the
Treasury needed to abandon the theory, as well as its policy justification. 89
In doing so, the Treasury to a great extent ignored the terrain it had in
large part created. First, although embracing in the preamble to the proposed regulations the aspect of the Petersoncourt's analysis that relies on
the taxable-transfer theory's justification," the Treasury nevertheless
rejects the theory itself in the preamble to the final regulations.9" Second,
although the Treasury continues to endorse the policy justification in the
power-of-appointment setting, it refuses to permit the justification to operate in the context of the invasion technique. Third, the decision to abandon
the theory came after the government had convinced the Peterson court
that Congress had ratified the theory in 1986. And finally, the Treasury
overruled the Simpson decision in the new regulations, even though the
court held that the statute itself clearly mandates its holding.92 In effect,
rather than continuing to litigate with taxpayers, the government declared
victory by regulation, choosing to uphold the aspect of the Peterson decision that it found favorable, rejecting the aspect of the Peterson decision

The exercise of a special power of appointment, including the exercise of an invasion power by a trustee, ordinarily is not a taxable event. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-1(c)
87

(2001).

8 See T.D. 7713, 1980-2 C.B. 283, 285.
89 In taking the position that an invasion in further trust (which, as indicated, is in
effect the exercise of a special power of appointment, see supra note 20) should be treated
as an addition, the Treasury also deviated from well-ingrained principles that the Treasury
itself recently invoked in another context. See T.D. 8956,2001-32 C.B. 112 (indicating that
the trust, not the donee of the power, becomes subject to tax under I.R.C § 684 (West Supp.
1997) at the time the power is exercised in further trust because the donee is not, as a matter
of "general principles," viewed as making a transfer).
9
oSee GST Issues, 64 Fed. Reg. 62997, 62999 (Nov. 18, 1999).
91
92 See T.D. 8912, 2001-5 C.B. 452.
See Simpson, 183 F.3d at 816. As will be discussed, when a statute unambiguously
requires a particular construction, an agency is precluded from adopting a contrary interpretation. See infra notes 268-271 and accompanying text.
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that it found unfavorable, and completely disregarding the Simpson decision.
At one time, the courts would have frowned upon such opportunistic
rewriting of regulations, but the Supreme Court's Chevron doctrine has
had a transformative impact on the power of the agencies, including the
Treasury.93 Part II will examine the resulting expansion in agency authority, and Part I will return to a consideration of these regulations, focusing
on their validity in the face of Congress' ratification of a contrary approach
in 1986 and the evolving Chevron doctrine.
PART II. THE CHEVRON DOCTRINE
In recent years, under its Chevron doctrine, the Supreme Court has
preferred that agencies (including the Treasury94), rather than the courts,
resolve questions of statutory ambiguity through the writing, and rewriting,
of regulations. Even prior to Chevron, the Court required deferential
review of agency interpretations, 95 but Chevron made two changes.9 6 First,
it increased the level of deference.97 Previously, the courts were required

to examine a variety of factors in determining whether or not in any given
case the interpretation was persuasive and, therefore, entitled to deference.9" Now, Chevron requires courts to give controlling deference to an
Prior to Chevron, the courts were less deferential to the agencies, permitting, for
example, the adversarial origin of an interpretation to weigh against its validity. See infra
notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
94 See United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380 (1999) (indicating that the
validity of tax regulations must be analyzed under Chevron). For a general discussion of
Haggar,see Claire R. Kelly & Patrick C. Reed, Once More Unto the Breach: Reconciling
Chevron Analysis and De Novo Judicial Review After United States v. Haggar Apparel
Company, 49 Am. U.L. REV. 1167 (2000).
95 See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (discussing the standard for deference for treasury
and other regulations). See also United States v. Mead Corp., 121 S. Ct. 2164, 2171-72
(2001) (reviewing the pre-Chevron history).
96 See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in
Statutory
97 Interpretation,108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 615 (1995).
See id.
98 See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (demonstrating whether the courts are required to
defer to an agency interpretation depends upon, inter alia, the thoroughness of the agency's
analysis, the soundness of the analysis, and its consistency with earlier interpretations);
Nat'l Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979) (indicating that
court should review tax regulations based on a variety of factors, including the consistency
of the Treasury's position; whether the government issued regulations contemporaneously
with the enactment of the statute; how the regulation evolved; the length of time the regula93
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interpretation if the statute is ambiguous and the agency's approach constitutes a reasonable resolution of that ambiguity. 99
Second, Chevron began to justify deference in a new way. No longer
focusing exclusively on agency expertise as ajustification, the Court began
to emphasize political accountability.'00 As a part of the executive branch,
agencies are more politically accountable than courts and are therefore a
more suitable repository for interpretive responsibility."1 The connection
between political accountability and interpretive responsibility flows from
the growing realization that law construction is often the equivalent of
lawmaking. l 2 Law construction entails the making of policy, a function
tion has remained in effect; the degree of taxpayer reliance; and the level of scrutiny the
regulation received from Congress during the consideration of any reenacting legislation).
See also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Comm'r, 102 T.C. 1, 13 (1994), aff'd, 41 F.3d
130 (3rd Cir. 1994) and affld sub nom. Conoco, Inc. v. Comm'r, 42 F.3d 972 (5th Cir.
1995) (applying Nat ' Muffler, a pre-Chevron formulation, the court intimated that if the
regulation under inquiry had been in order to gain a litigating advantage, its validity might
have been questionable); Comm'r v. Stemberger's Estate, 348 U.S. 187, 199 (1955) (showing that longstanding regulations are entitled to special weight).
99 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. The courts, however, occasionally continue to
refer to considerations utilized by the courts prior to Chevron. See, e.g., Nordtvedt v.
Comm'r, 116 T.C. 165, 170 (2001) (citing Sternberger's Estate for proposition that a
"weighty" justification is required before overturning a longstanding regulation).
The Supreme Court has made a distinction in the verbal formulation it applies when
reviewing legislative and interpretive regulations. In the former case, the Court inquires
whether the regulation is arbitrary or capricious (see Mead, 121 S. Ct. at 2171 (referencing
Chevron)), but in the latter case it examines the regulation to determine if it reasonably
resolves the statutory ambiguity. See id. at 2172 (also referencing Chevron). Some courts
continue to suggest that these verbal formulations create two different standards capable of
producing different outcomes. See, e.g., Walton v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 589, 597 (2000)
(indicating that legislative regulations are entitled to more deference than interpretive
regulations). Nevertheless, as a practical reality, the two formulations seem indistinguishable and unlikely to produce different outcomes. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.,
499 U.S. 244, 260 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(suggesting that, when Chevron applies, making the pre-Chevron distinction between
legislative and interpretive regulations is no longer useful); Boeing Co. v. United States,
258 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the decision whether the regulation at issue
was legislative or interpretive was unnecessary because, under either standard, it would be
valid). For a further discussion of the conflicting authorities on the question, see John F.
Coverdale, CourtReview of Tax Regulations andRevenue Rulings in the Chevron Era, 64
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 35, 48-49 (1995).
'oo See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66 (setting forth the political-accountability theory,
but also acknowledging the limited expertise ofjudges as compared to the agencies).
101 See Schacter, supra note 96, at 616-17.
102 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66; Schacter, supra note 96, at 595-96. See also
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better served, under the Court's new theory, by the politically accountable
agencies rather than by the politically insulated courts. 3 Thus, under
Chevron, deference no longer rests solely on agency expertise for its justification but rather, as the Court stressed, on an agency's political accountability as well."°
This is not to suggest, however, that in the absence of deference, interpretive decisions would be politically unconstrained. On the contrary, if a
judicial interpretation proved to be problematic, Congress obviously would
be urged to overturn it. And, to the extent that legislative redress were not
provided, Congress-as well as the President-would face political consequences. Thus, in a nondeference world the judge would have more
decision-making discretion, but political accountability would nevertheless
continue to exert an important influence. 5 The question, in other words,
is not whether political accountability should have a role in the interpreta-

tion of statutes, but rather what king of role it should play.
Chevron 's reach in the tax area had, until recently, been the subject of

some question. 0 6 It was at first unclear whether Chevron applied to the
Treasury's interpretive regulations, because unlike legislative regulations,
there is no statutory requirement that the public be given notice and an
opportunity for comment before interpretive regulations are promulDavid Millon, Objectivity and Democracy, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 16-22 (1992).
103

While the Court also justified Chevron deference as a matter of separation of

powers, see, e.g., Mead, 121 S. Ct. at 2179 (Scalia, J., dissenting), the predominant view is
that it derives from a delegation by Congress. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E.
Hickman, Chevron'sDomain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001).
104 Although one might read Chevron as deemphasizing the significance of expertise
as a justificatory theory for deference, the Court has made clear that expertise remains an
important justificatory component. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496
U.S. 633, 651-652 (1990) (stating that "practical agency expertise is one of the principal
justifications behind Chevron deference"). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Law andAdministration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071, 2088-90 (1990).
105 The judge, moreover, is not completely free of accountability. See Antonin Scalia,
The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, The Oliver Wendell Holmes Bicentennial Lecture,
Harvard Law School (February 14, 1989), in 56 U. CIO. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989) (indicating that judges are accountable to the criticisms of the bar and the academy).
106 Some critics have even questioned Chevron's legitimacy as a general matter,
suggesting it lacks consistency with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). See Mead,
121 S. Ct. at 21797, n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme
Court and the APA: Sometimes They Just Don't Get It, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 9-11
(1996)) (suggesting that the APA could be read as requiring that courts review statutory
ambiguity de novo).
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gated.' °7 Even though the Treasury in fact provides notice and opportunity
for comment in issuing interpretive regulations, some suggested that Chevron might not apply in this context.' °8 Second, given the specialized nature
of the Tax Court and its expertise, there was some doubt whether it would
be appropriate to impose Chevron and thereby require the court to defer to
the expertise of the Treasury.0 9 Both of these questions, however, are now
be resolved. The Supreme Court has made clear that Chevron's framework
is applicable to interpretive regulations" 0 and that the Tax Court, despite
its own expertise, is required to give Chevron deference to the Treasury's
regulations. "' Recently, moreover, the Supreme Court held that an interpretation issued without notice and comment might nevertheless be entitled

107

See, e.g., First Chicago NBD Corp. v. Comm'r, 135 F.3d 457, 459 (7th Cir. 1998)

(no statutory requirement for public notice and comment with regard to interpretive regulations). See also David M. Hasen, The Ambiguous Basis ofJudicialDeference to Administrative Rules, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 327, 333 (2000) (stating that interpretive regulations,
because they need not be promulgated with notice and opportunity for comment, are not
binding on the courts). See generally Ellen P. Aprill, Muffled Chevron:JudicialReview of
Tax Regulations, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 51, 76-78 (1996) (discussing the courts' uncertainty
about ap1plying Chevron in the case of interpretive regulations).
0
" See FirstChicagoNBD, 135 F.3d at 459 (quoting Linda Galler, JudicialDeference
to Revenue Rulings: ReconcilingDivergentStandards,56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1044 (1995)
and indicating that, in the Seventh Circuit, Chevron's applicability with regard to interpretive regulations was an open question); see also Pac. First Fed. Say. v. Comm'r, 961 F.2d
800, 803 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that deciding whether Chevron applies in the tax context
was unnecessary); Aprill, supra note 107, at 76-78.
109 As late as 1995, the Tax Court noted that the question of the applicability of
Chevron in the context of interpretive regulations was an unresolved question. See Cent.
Pa. Say. Ass'n and Subsidiaries v. Comm'r, 104 T.C. 384, 391-92 (1995).
110 See At. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm'r, 523 U.S. 382, 389 (1998) (applying Chevron
with respect to an interpretive regulation and citing as authority Cottage Say. Assn. v.
Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554, 560-61 (1991), in which an interpretive regulation also was at
issue). Butsee Gen. Elec. Co. v .Comm'r, 245 F.3d 149, 154, n.8 (2d Cir. 2001) (reviewing
the authorities and suggesting whether tax regulation should receive deference under
Chevron or perhaps some other level of deference under Nat'l Muffler, 440 U.S. at 476-77
(1979)1continues to be an open question).
"
See HaggarApparel,526 U.S. at 394 (applying Chevron despite the claim that the
expertise of the Court of International Trade required otherwise and indicating the Tax
Court similarly was required to defer to Treasury regulations). Surprisingly, however,
courts continue to question whether the Chevron standard applies to interpretive tax regulations, whether the standard the Court previously applied in Nat 7 Muffler, 440 U.S. at 477,
governs, and whether the two standards differ. See Walton, 115 T.C. at 598. See also
Aprill, supra note 107, at 58-59, 63-73 (discussing and comparing the Chevron and National Muffler standards).
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to Chevron deference."2
Under Chevron, once a court finds that a statute is ambiguous, the
court is obliged to defer to any reasonable resolution of the ambiguity
embodied in a regulation-provided Congress contemplated that the agency would have interpretive authority and the agency issues its interpretation in a format Congress anticipated would be binding on the courts."'
Thus, in any case involving the construction of a statute under which an
agency has interpretive authority," 4 the threshold question is whether the
statute is ambiguous. "5 The lower courts' disagreement about the meaning
of a statute may suggest that the statute contains the requisite ambiguity to
invoke Chevron deference. In Smiley v. Citibank,"6 the Court, in making
the threshold inquiry, emphasized that the different readings the statute had
received in the Supreme Courts of New Jersey and California was in itself
a strong indication of ambiguity."' If courts apply this approach at the
federal level-and no apparent reason exists why disagreement in the
federal courts should be viewed differently--Chevron may have transformed the role of the Supreme Court itself."' Inter-circuit conflict traditionally has been a basis for granting review of tax litigation in the Su112
3

1
114

See Mead, 121 S. Ct. at 2173 (2001).
See id. at 2171.
To invoke Chevron, the delegation of interpretive authority must be clear. See

Mead, 121 S. Ct. at 2172-73 (referencing the argument made by Justice Breyer in dissent in
Christensenv. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000), that Chevron should not apply when
the statute leaves doubt about Congress' intent to delegate interpretive authority). In
contrast, Justice Scalia asserted that Congress should be understood presumptively as
delegating such authority. See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 591 (Scalia, J., concurring in part);
Mead, 121 S. Ct. at 2178 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
5 A question remains as to the appropriate use of legislative history in the context of
a Chevron analysis. See, e.g., Gen. Elec., 245 F.3d at 156 n.9 (indicating that Chevron itself
contemplates the use of legislative history and that the Court in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 14748 (2000), considered legislative history, but suggesting that the appropriateness of referring to legislative history under Chevron remains an
open question). For a decision holding that, if an examination of the legislative history can
resolve the ambiguity, the agency's interpretation is not entitled to deference, see Dominion
Res., Inc. v. United States, 219 F.3d 359, 366 (4th Cir. 2000). See generally Aprill, supra
note 107, at 81-87 (discussing the use of legislative history in the context of Chevron).
116 517 U.S. 735, 739 (1996).
"'8 See id. at 739.
"1 See Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron: The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 821, 822 (1990) (suggesting that the Supreme Court may be less inclined
than the lower courts to grant deference under Chevron to an interpretation embodying a
policy judgment on an issue of particular interest with which the Supreme Court disagrees).
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preme Court, but such conflict may now argue in favor of deference to the
Treasury's construction, resulting, as a practical matter, in a limit on the

Court's authority." 9
Indeed, it is arguable that the Court uses its resources improvidently
when it grants review in a tax case to resolve an inter-circuit conflict, or,

for that matter, whenever the statute is ambiguous. Under Chevron 's logic,
the Court should yield to any post-decision regulation that reasonably
resolves the ambiguity, even if that regulation is contrary to the approach
adopted by the Court. Although permitting an agency to replace the

Court's interpretation of a statute with its own contrary interpretation is
novel and inconsistent with the traditional understanding of the role of the
judiciary, 20 Chevron'spreference for agency resolution of statutory ambi-

" 9 See Gitlitz v. Commissioner, 531 U.S. 206, 217 n.7 (2001) (noting that a conflict

in the circuit courts had developed on the issue, but concluding that the statute was unambiguous). Gitlitz could therefore possibly be viewed as inconsistent with Smiley's notion
that lower-court conflict is suggestive of ambiguity, but a distinction may be made between
these cases. In Gitlitz,unlike Smiley, the Court engaged in conventional statutory construction and, therefore, did not make a Chevron analysis. Although the Treasury had issued a
proposed regulation addressing the question before the Court in Gitlitz, see Prop. Treas.
Reg. §1.1366-1 (a)(2)(viii), 63 Fed. Reg. 44181 (1998), the Court not surprisingly chose to
omit the proposed regulation from its discussion and was therefore left to decide the case
without the assistance of any administrative interpretation. See LeCroy Research Sys. Corp.
v. Comm'r, 751 F.2d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 1984) (granting no deference for proposed regulations). But see Estate of Shelfer v. Comm'r, 86 F.3d 1045, 1048 n.4 (11th Cir. 1996)
(indicating that the Supreme Court has not determined definitively whether proposed
regulations should receive deference). The Court was presumably anxious to find the
statute unambiguous in order to avoid two points made by Justice Breyer in his dissent: the
Court's analysis was inconsistent with the statute's legislative history, and an ambiguous
Code section should be construed to avoid a loophole rather than to preserve it, which was
the effect of the Court's holding. See Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 220-24 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Perhaps, another way to read Smiley, in light of Gitlitz, is that although inter-circuit conflict
presumptively leads to a finding of ambiguity, it does not necessarily do so in every case.
In any event, the Treasury likely will feel somewhat intimidated by the Court's holding that
the statute is unambiguous and accordingly modify the proposed regulations. See infra note
121.
120 See Mead, 121 S. Ct. at 2182 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (indicating it would be a
"landmark abdication ofjudicial power" for the Court to permit an agency to overturn the
Court's construction of a statute, though indicating that an agency remains free to change
its interpretation after the Court upholds the interpretation as a reasonable resolution of
statutory ambiguity, or after the circuit courts construe the statute); see also Hasen, supra
note 107, at 362 (indicating that to permit an agency to overrule Court precedent is inconsistent with "the strong policy in favor of upholding prior judicial interpretations.").

WINTER 2002

Deference and the End of Tax Practice 753

guity does lead in this direction."'2 In EstateofHubert v. Commissioner,122
though not citing Chevron, the three-justice concurring opinion followed
this lead and invited new regulations incorporating the very argument that
the government had advanced unsuccessfully before the Court. 23 Shortly
after the Hubert decision, the Treasury accepted the invitation and overturned the Court's decision by issuing regulations. 2 4 From this vantage
point, it would seem that the Court made an unwise commitment of
resources in deciding to grant review in Hubert.2 '
121

Although in Chevron the Court made clear that a regulation could overrule a lower

court precedent, whether the Court would uphold a regulation contrary to one of its own
precedents is unclear. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 841-42; Redlark v. Comm'r, 141 F.3d 936,
939-40 (9th Cir. 1998) (indicating under Chevron, lower court precedent could be overruled
by subsequent regulation). But see Bankers Trust New York Corp. v. U.S., 225 F.3d 1368
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (finding that the panel of the circuit court was bound by prior circuit
precedent despite intervening regulation overruling precedent). In Neal v. United States,
516 U.S. 284 (1996), the Court had construed the statute before the agency issued its
contrary interpretation. The Court invalidated the agency's interpretation, indicating that
the Court's prior construction was definitive as a matter of stare decisis, and, therefore, the
Court could not sustain the agency's interpretation. See id. at 295. Although one might
read Neal for the broad proposition that Chevron deference is made unavailable once the
Supreme Court has construed a statute (see Bankers Trust New York Corp., 225 F.3d at
1375), it also can be read for a narrower proposition: once the Court concludes that a
statute is unambiguous, the agency is precluded from adopting an interpretation that is
inconsistent with the Court's interpretation. Indeed, in both cases cited in Neal in support
of its decision to deny deference, the Court stated: "Once we have determined a statute's
"
clear meaning, we adhere to that determination under the doctrine of stare decisis..
Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 131 (1990); Lechmere, Inc.
v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 536-537 (1992) (quoting from Maislin) (emphasis added). But see
supra note 120.
In Estate of Hubert v. Comm'r, 520 U.S. 93 (1997) (O'Connor, J., Souter, J., Thomas,
J., concurring), as indicated in text, three Justices, in a concurring opinion, suggested that
the government's argument, though rejected by the Court, could be adopted in new regulations. See id. at 122. Although one could view this suggestion as consistent with the
narrower reading of Neal, it is also not necessarily inconsistent with the broader reading in
that the Court in Hubert construed an ambiguous regulation, not a statute. Cf Bankers
Trust New York Corp., 225 F.3d at 1375 (agreeing with the broader reading of Neal and
indicating that deference to an agency interpretation overruling a lower court decision might
be appropriate when the Court based its decision on an earlier agency interpretation).
22 520 U.S. 93 (1997).
'23See id. at 122.
124 For a discussion of these regulations, see Mitchell M. Gans, Jonathan G. Blattmachr
& Carlyn S. McCaffrey, The Anti-Hubert Regulations, 87 TAX NOTES 969 (2000).
12
' Given the Court's inclination to permit tax issues to resolve themselves without its
intervention (see John J. Tigue & Jeremy H. Temkin, The Supreme Court's 1999-2000
Term, N.Y. L.J., July 20, 2000, at 3) the decision to grant review in Hubert remains puz-
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Chevron is potentially transformative in another important way. Given
its political-accountability underpinnings, agency-administered statutes
may no longer have a fixed meaning. 12 6 In Smiley.2 a regulation was
promulgated approximately one hundred years after the enactment of the
underlying statute. 2 ' After acknowledging the traditional view that a
regulation issued contemporaneously with the enactment of the statute
ordinarily receives deference on that account, the Court in Smiley concluded that the delay was of no consequence.'2 9 The Court reasoned that
because Congress presumedly intended for ambiguities to be resolved by
the politically-accountable agencies, the validity of a regulation is not
undermined by a lapse in time. 3 '
Because contemporaneousness is no longer necessary, the question
becomes whether agencies must remain consistent. If, for example, an
agency adopts one construction of an ambiguous statute, can it later adopt
the opposite construction if a president with a different political philosophy is elected even though there has been no intervening legislation?
Emphasizing again the political-accountability theory behind Chevron, the
Court indicated that, in general, consistency is not required and that, absent
an abuse of discretion or a failure to respect reliance interests, the agencies
generally remain free to amend their regulations and alter positions previously taken.' 3' Though agencies remain required to proffer a satisfactory
justification for a change in position (imposing on agencies a duty to be
consistent in a way that is somewhat analogous to the duty that the doctrine
of stare decisis imposes on the courts),' 32 Chevron has led to a greater
zlingi26 See Silberman, supra note 118, at 822 (indicating that statutes have become more
plastic under Chevron); T. Alexander Aleinikoff,Symposium: Pattersonv. McLean, Updating Statutory Interpretation,87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 43 (1988) (indicating that, under Chev-

ron, statutes are more likely to receive an interpretation that is reflective of policy as currently formulated, rather than policy considerations at the time of enactment).
127

128

517 U.S. at 735.
See id. at 740.

129 See id.

130 See id. at 740-41.
131 See id. at 743. This was dicta, given that the Court also concluded that, in fact, the

agency had not changed its position.
132 See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S.
800, 808 (1973) ("Whatever the ground for the departure from prior norms, however, it
must be clearly set forth so that the reviewing court may understand the basis of the
agency's action and so may judge the consistency of that action with the agency's mandate."). See also Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 42 (1983) (citing Atchison, the Court
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willingness to embrace such change.'
Indeed, following Chevron's political-accountability theory to its
logical conclusion, one might argue that whatever remains of the agencies'
obligation to justify change ought to be eliminated. Consider, for example,
the propensity to issue regulations in the waning hours of the administration. No longer facing the same intensity of political consequence, a lame
duck administration understandably would be tempted to issue regulations
that would have been politically unappealing at an earlier point in its tenure.134 An incoming administration should to be able to reverse course
said that "an agency changing its course by rescinding a rule is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be required when an agency does not
act in the first instance"); AFL-CIO v. Brock, 835 F.2d 912, 917 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing
Atchison and Motor Vehicle Mfrs.).
133 In FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 529 U.S. 120 (2000), the fourjustice dissent indicated that it agreed with the majority that the FDA's departure from its
original interpretation was not legally significant. See id. at 186. The dissent cites to
Chevron and Smiley, as does the majority, for the propositions that "an initial agency
interpretation is not instantly carved in stone" (Chevron) and "change is not invalidating"
(Smiley). Id. The dissent also approvingly quotes as follows from a concurring-in-part-anddissenting-in-part opinion by Justice Rehnquist in Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 59
(1983):
The agency's changed view of the standard seems to be related to the election of
a new President of a different political party. It is readily apparent that the responsible members of one administration may consider public resistance and
uncertainties to be more important than do their counterparts in a previous administration. A change in administration brought about by the people casting their
votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency's reappraisal of the
costs and benefits of its programs and regulations. As long as the agency remains
within the bounds established by Congress, it is entitled to assess administrative
records and evaluate priorities in light of the philosophy of the administration.
Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 189. Thus, at least five justices (the four dissenting
Justices in Brown & Williamson and Justice Rehnquist) apparently were prepared to validate
an agency's modification in its position on the ground that a change in administration
occurred, without requiring any additional justification. Although this approach is consistent with Chevron'spolitical-accountability underpinnings, it does reflect a movement away
from the requirement that change must be justified.
This movement has been reflected in the tax area. In Georgia Fed. Bank v. Comm'r,
98 T.C. 105, 108 (1992), citing Motor Vehicles Mfrs. and pointing to the government's
modification in its approach and its failure tojustify it adequately, the Tax Court invalidated
a regulation. However, after the circuit courts began taking a contrary view (see Aprill,
supra note 107, at 67-74), the Tax Court overruled its earlier decision and validated the
regulation despite the government's inconsistency. See Cent. Pa. Sav., 104 T.C. at 384.
134 See, e.g., Douglas Jehl, G.O.P. To Pressfor Unraveling of Clinton Acts, N.Y.
TtMEs, January 6,2001, at Al (making reference to a "blizzard" of last-minute orders issued
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without needing to supply a justification, given the friction of political
consequences that will ensue and the diminished level of friction facing the
prior administration when it adopted the interpretation. Stated differently,
why should an agency decision, once made, be viewed as presumptively
valid and binding if its legitimacy rests on the erroneous premise that it
was the product of full, active political calculation?135 Moreover, even
when the agency's initial position is forged under the pressure of fullblown political forces, it seems inconsistent with Chevron to give the
courts the gate-keeping function of deciding whether the change is justified
because the decision to deviate from the initial position is equally informed
by political considerations.
In short, with delay irrelevant and consistency not essential, agencyadministered statutes containing ambiguities become mutable 3 6-- or, to
' -no longer
borrow from the constitutional lexicon,"living documents"' 137
3
having the meaning fixed by Congress ' at the time of their enactment.' 39
in the Clinton administration).
135

The emerging willingness to validate a change in agency interpretation occurring

as a result of a change in administration is, therefore, not a surprising development. See
supra note 133.
136 For a case in the tax context in which the Court permitted the government to amend
the regulations to change the position it had taken originally without any substantial justification, see Nat'lMuffler, 440 U.S. at 485-86 (upholding an alteration in the regulations as
justified by administrative experience, although no explanation had been offered, and
emphasizing
the need for administrative flexibility).
13 7 See Silberman, supra note 118, at 822 (suggesting that some might find it surprising that judges who subscribe to originalism in constitutional adjudication can at the same
time argue for Chevron's implicit commitment to viewing statutes as plastic).
Chevron creates the potential for wholesale revision in the meaning of statutes over
time, but the courts, in doing conventional statutory interpretation, also give some consideration to post-enactment events and thereby permit the meaning of statutes to shift as values
change. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretationas
PracticalReasoning,42 STAN. L. REv. 321,345-62 (1990) (indicating that courts interpret
statutory language through the prism of post-enactment values). For a recent example in
which the Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged the role of post-enactment change in
constitutional values affecting the interpretation of a statute, see Circuit City, Inc. v. Adams,
121 S. Ct. 1302 (2001) (holding, in effect, that the reach of a statute can expand over time
where the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the contours of the commerce clause have
changed since enactment). However, some scholars argue that, at least in the tax context,
it is important that courts focus on the statute's underlying purpose or structure, as opposed
to the various considerations suggested by Professor Eskridge and others. See Michael
Livingston, PracticalReason, "Purposivism," and the Interpretationof Tax Statutes, 51
TAX L. REv. 677, 682-88 (1998) (reviewing the arguments made to this effect, but arguing
to the contrary). At bottom, the difficult jurisprudential question seems to be how to
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Chevron 's implications, as embellished by Smiley, may presage the
end of an inveterate aspect of tax litigation. In the past, the government's
defeat in Simpson likely would have led to further review in other circuits,
or perhaps in the Supreme Court, on the ground that it conflicted with
Peterson. Now, the government instead simply writes a new regulation
announcing the result it failed to secure in court. As indicated, rather than
becoming a predicate for Supreme Court review, inter-circuit conflict
becomes evidence of statutory ambiguity, making the Treasury, not the
Supreme Court, the ultimate interpretive authority. If the tax bar at one
time viewed the Treasury as a mere adversary, that view no longer accurately reflects the more dynamic role the Treasury now enjoys. In short,
given its enhanced quasi-legislative function under Chevron, the government is no ordinary adversary because it can rewrite the rules in many
cases rather than litigate the meaning of the rules as originally written.
Is this a salutary alteration? The answer is not clear. On the one hand,
allowing the Treasury more influence is valuable because of its enormous
expertise-an expertise understandably lacking in many judges sitting on
tax cases."4 Unlike the courts, the Treasury is able to bring this expertise
to bear on an entire area of law at one time, facilitating an appreciation of
the various ways in which the rules it promulgates interface. Also, Congress may not be able to respond as quickly as the Treasury to resolve
issues not contemplated at the time of the statute's enactment. 4' Moreover, Congress may be completely disabled from acting because nonconstrue the Code when its language clearly calls for a result that is contrary to some
fundamental tax theme. In Comm'r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 313 (1983), for example, the
Court abandoned the interpretation of the Code it found appropriate in Crane v. Comm'r,
331 U.S. 1, 14 n.37 (1947), alluding to its concern that taxable income should be reflective
of economic income. In Gitlitz v. Comm'r, 531 U.S. at 206, on the other hand, the Court,
acknowledging that the result it reached would unfortunately convert economic income into
tax-free income, nevertheless perceived itself as constrained by the clear language of the
Code. See id. at 220.
139 For an argument that the mutability Chevron offers is salutary, see Mead, 121 S. Ct.
at 2178, 2182 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Sunstein, supra note 104, at 2089-90.
140 Ofcourse, Treasury expertise as ajustification for Chevron deference is not entirely

convincing as much litigation occurs in the specialized Tax Court. However, taxpayers can
seek to exploit the lack of expertise in other courts by choosing to litigate elsewhere. For
a discussion of these difficulties and a proposal that addresses them, see infra Part VI.
141 See Mead, 121 S. Ct. at 2181 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that "ossification" of
the law would occur if the agencies did not receive Chevron deference); Sunstein, supra
note 104, at 2088 (indicating that agencies are better situated than Congress to respond to
changed circumstances and new developments).
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policy-based concerns trump any legitimate policy objective.142 And, as
some commentators have suggested, increased deference tends to create
by reducing the potential for disagreemore uniform application of the4 law
3

ment among the circuit courts. 1

On the other hand, there is the question of the Treasury's bias. 44 It
would, for example, be difficult to maintain that the government's loss in
Simpson did not, in some way, affect its perspective. Indeed, the Treasury's very position as the taxpayer's adversary in tax litigation will tend
to produce bias. Just as criminal prosecutors are not given the quasi-legislative responsibility of defining the elements of the crimes they prosecute,
so too, one might argue, more skepticism would be appropriate regarding
the scope of the Treasury's lawmaking function. 45 Although judges are
certainly not free of bias,"4 at least they do not suffer the bias one acquires

142 See DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANAL-

86-88 (2001) (arguing that the public
choice critique of legislation is particularly compelling in the tax context). See also THE
FEDERALIST No. 10, at 56 (James Madison) (Legal Classics Library ed., 1983) ("The
apportionment of taxes on the various de[s]criptions of property, is an act which [s]eems to
require the mo[s]t exact impartiality, yet there is perhaps no legi[s]lative act in which
greater opportunity and temptation are given to a predominant party, to trample on the rules
ofjustice.").
143 See Silberman, supra note 118 at 824; see also Colin Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 549, 585-92 (1985) (granting deference
to agencies will make policy more coherent and will unify the law by locating decisionmaking authority in the agencies rather than in the various courts of appeals). Moreover, at
least in the tax area, some sentiment favors minimizing inter-circuit conflict. See Popov v.
Comm'r, 246 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2001) (stressing the importance of uniformity in the
tax area and the need to maintain consistency among the circuits). On the other hand,
uniformity creates another concern: the lost opportunity for the courts to experiment with
different approaches and to reflect on alternative ways of addressing the problem.
144 See generallyDavid A. Weisbach, Cost ofDeparturesfromFormalism:Formalism
in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHn. L. REv. 860-86 (1999) (discussing bias in terms of tax administrators from a public choice perspective).
14 See Lars Noah, DiviningRegulatoryIntent: The Placefor a "Legislative History"
of Agency Rules, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 255, 294 & n. 149 (2000) (citing John F. Manning,
ConstitutionalStructureandJudicialDeference to Agency InterpretationsofAgency Rules,
YSIS OF TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACTWITY

96 COLuM. L. REv. 612, 631 (1996) and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S.

410 (1945), and indicating that a constitutional (separation of powers) impediment possibly
exists in permitting an agency to perform quasi-legislative and interpretative functions).
146 See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the JudicialMind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777,
777-830 (2001); see generally ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM &JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE
LAW (2000) (describing cultural myths that affect judges' decisionmaking).
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Thus, if disinterested, unbiased analysis is the objective, one can make a fairly compelling argument that Chevron's shift of
power from the courts to the agencies 49 is not entirely desirable.'
14

One might also negatively view this alteration because of the resulting
diminution in the courts' authority to limit the abusive exercise of power
by another branch of government. 5' The Service has recently been perceived as an unresponsive bureaucracy. 5 2 To the extent that a disinterested judge might be able to restrain bureaucratic power, Chevron can be
seen as bureaucracy entrenching. This is somewhat ironic. As the percep147 See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (1944) (indicating that the Court gives considerable,
and in some cases decisive weight to tax regulations, provided that the regulation is "not of
adversary origin"). Skidmore's contemporary importance has been enhanced greatly. See
Christensen,529 U.S. at 588; Mead, 121 S. Ct. at 2178, 2182. Indeed, Justice Scalia has
argued that the Court has in effect resurrected Skidmore, which in his view was supplanted
by Chevron. See Christensen, 120 U.S. at 589 (Scalia, J., concurring).
148 To the extent that one perceives the government as acting unfairly, the
willingness
of taxpayers to comply voluntarily will be affected adversely. See Eric A. Posner, Law and
SocialNorms: The Caseof Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781, 1812 (2000) (suggesting
that when the Service acts unfairly, it sends a signal to taxpayers that will undermine voluntary compliance).
149 Prior to Chevron, the Court was reluctant to review regulations deferentially when
issued in order to gain adversarial advantage. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
Under Smiley, however, a regulation is entitled to controlling deference even if adopted for
the purpose of influencing pending litigation (though in Smiley, the agency was not a party
to the litigation, when the government is always a party in tax litigation). See Smiley, 517
U.S. at 741 (1996). The government's ability to influence a pending tax litigation by
issuing a regulation has been constrained by the 1996 amendment to I.R.C. section
7805(b)(1) which prohibits, as a general matter, retroactive regulations. See Taxpayer Bill
of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 1101(a), 110 Stat. 1452, 1468 (1996). On the other hand,
Smiley does contemplate that a regulation issued after a transaction has been consummated
can be relevant even when the agency does not have the authority to issue regulations on a
retroactive
basis. See Smiley, 517 U.S. at 744 n.3.
150 See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms and Incentives ofRetrospective Decision-Making, 75 B.U. L. REV. 941, 958, 963-65, 994-95 (1995) (discussing the incentives
that lead judges to adhere to professional norms in decisionmaking rather than yielding to
considerations of political expediency); DANIEL E. TROY, INDEFENSE OF RETROACTIVE
LAws 11 (1998) (discussing the apolitical nature of the courts and the likelihood that their
review will be disinterested).
151 See Thomas W. Merrill,JudicialDeference to Executive President, 101 YALE L.J.
969, 996-97 (1992) (emphasizing the weakness of Presidential oversight and the need for
judicial review to limit the potential for agency abuse of power).
152 See Steve R. Johnson, The Dangers of Symbolic Legislation: Perceptions and
Realities of the new Burden-of-ProofRules, 84 IowA L. REV. 413, 446 (1999) (describing
the Service as having a "fortress mentality," and as being self-protective and unresponsive).
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tion of the Service has grown more negative, a corresponding popular

impulse to curtail its authority has arisen.'53 Oddly, at the very time this

impulse took root, the courts enhanced the government's authority through
Chevron in the name of political accountability. In other words, the Supreme Court has, in effect, enhanced the power of an unpopular agency in
the name of sensitivity to popular will.
Finally, although Chevron's political accountability justification has
been critiqued elsewhere,' 54 a few negative critical comments follow.
First, the Court's recent decision in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
55 raises a new question about the justification. In Brown &
Corporation'
Williamson, the Court took the view that it would be inappropriate to infer
that Congress had intended that the FDA could use its interpretive authority to decide whether to regulate tobacco. 5 6 The Court reasoned that if
Congress had contemplated that the FDA could decide such an important
issue, it would have said so affirmatively and clearly, rather than remain
silent and assume the decision could be made under the agency's general
interpretive authority.157
In thus limiting the agency's discretion, the Court appears to have
engrafted a significant qualification onto Chevron. 5 ' Under this qualification, the more important the issue, the less likely the agency's decision will
be entitled to deference. This qualification seems contrary to the very

See, e.g., Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996).
'54 See Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen, Blank Checks: Restoring the Balance ofPowers
in the Post-ChevronEra,32 B.C. L. REv. 757,759-64,786-815 (1991) (criticizing Chevron
as undermining the authority of the judiciary); Cynthia Farina, Statutory Interpretationand
the BalanceofPower in the AdministrativeState, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989); Merrill
& Hickman, supra note 103, at 834 n.6, 840-53. It should also be noted that, to the extent
that acquiring information concerning policy choices is costly or time-consuming, people
153

may rationally choose ignorance, see, e.g.,

MANCUR OLSON, RATIONAL IGNORANCE, PRO-

FESSIONAL RESEARCH AND POLITICIANS' DILEMMAS, IN KNOWLEDGE, POWER AND THE

130 (William H. Robinson & Clay H. Wellborn eds., 1991) (discussing the
notion that people may rationally choose ignorance with regard to public policy), thus
undercutting Chevron's political-accountability premise.
155 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
156
See id. at 161.
57
. See id. at 160-61.
158 See also Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n., 531 U.S. 457,468 (2001) (indicating
that in determining whether a statute is ambiguous, it is appropriate to assume that Congress
would not delegate the authority to resolve a "highly significant issue" to an agency (quoting Christensen, 529 U.S. at 590).
CONGRESS
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premise of political accountability: that the resolution of issues by the
agencies will produce a political response, and the agencies, anticipating
such a response, will either behave appropriately or pay a political price.
If the issue is an important and visible one, the qualification renders Chevron deference unavailable. If, on the other hand, the issue is unimportant
and not very visible, the agency will receive deference; however, in this
latter context, the probability of political consequence is greatly diminished. In short, as so qualified, Chevron produces deference where political consequence is least likely, a result completely contrary to its politicalaccountability theory.'59
Second, the current controversy about campaign finance is also relevant to the merits of the justification. As many have argued, in the absence

of reform, our system of democracy will remain in disrepair,"6 with campaign contributors influencing elected officials, who in turn, seek to influence (and, in the case of the President, direct) the decisions of administrators.' 6' As long as campaign contributions are permitted to have such a
negative impact on the decision-making process, the system will be better
served by an approach that gives more authority to politically insulated
62
judges than to politically vulnerable administrators.
159 During the presidential election that concluded in 2000, pollsters suggested the
electorate might select candidates without regard to the important issues, focusing instead,
for example, on the personality of the candidates. See Andrew Kohut, The Empty Centerof
Campaign 2000, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2000, at 31. To the extent that people choose presidents on the basis of personality, rather than on substantive issues or political philosophy,
the strength
of Chevron's political-accountability claim is diminished.
160 See, e.g., Daniel H. Lowenstein, PoliticalBribery and the Intermediate Theory of
Politics,32 UCLAL. REv. 784,826-28 (1985) (indicating that campaign contributions lead
to legislation inuring to the benefit of special interest groups). See also James B. Repetti,
Democracy, Taxes and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 825, 843-49 (2001) (discussing the
corrosive effects of campaign contributions on the political process).
161 See Dominic L. Daher, The ProposedFederalTaxation of FrequentFlyer Miles
Received From Employers: Good Tax PolicyBut Bad Politics, 16 AKRON TAx J. 1, 15-16
(2001) (discussing the Service's withdrawal of a technical advice memorandum after a
congressperson introduced a bill that would have rendered it invalid, and the fact that no
one suggested the bill was the product of campaign contributions).
"6'-See SHAVIRO, supra note 142, at 86-88 (arguing that tax legislation is more problematic in public choice terms than other kinds of legislation). See also William N.
Eskridge, Jr., InterpretingLegislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REv. 67, 105 (1988) (making
the public choice critique with regard to "subgovernments" (i.e., officials such as bureaucrats), who, because of their low visibility, are more likely to be responsive to special
interest groups); see id. at 114 (indicating that special interest groups may be able to secure
a favorable interpretation from a "captured agency").
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Third, institutional differences between the courts and the agencies
must be considered in assessing the justification. It would seem that an
underlying premise for the justification is the assumption that the agencies
and the courts, when called upon to interpret ambiguous statutes, engage in
approximately the same type of activity. If this is a valid premise, the
balance of Chevron's logic is inexorable. Because resolution of statutory
uncertainty by a court or an agency is essentially the same activity, it is
preferable that the more politically accountable of the two be assigned this
responsibility.
However, the ways that agencies and the courts execute their interpretive function differ. First, the agencies have more expertise as well as a
superior ability to engage in the kind of cost-benefit analysis that legislators make. 163 Second, judges are required to rely on canons of construction
and view themselves as bound by prior decisions as a matter of stare
decisis.I6 While agencies are obviously not oblivious to these doctrines,
they remain largely unencumbered by the restrictions these doctrines impose.1 65 Third, some suggest that judicial restraint requires the judge to set
forth explicitly the principle that animates each decision so that the judge's
opportunity to indulge a personal policy preference in future cases is constrained.1" More generally, judges' decisions are the product of various
nonpolitical incentives that narrow the range of available alternatives and
lead to more principled interpretations. 67 Agency decision-making, in
contrast, tends to be less principled in this sense and more responsive to
policy or political considerations. Also, as discussed, agencies are influenced by a kind of self-interest that does not impinge on the judge.
Fourth, though agencies ordinarily give their interpretations prospec163

See STEPHEN

HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY

224-25 (1999). See also Stephen Breyer, JudicialReview ofQuestions
ofLaw and Policy,38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 388-89 (1986) (discussing the capacity of the
agencies to gather relevant information).
164 See Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State:
ReconcilingModem Doctrinesof Deference with the Judiciary'sStructuralRole, STAN. L.
REV. 1, 34-37 (2000) (indicating the framers anticipated that stare decisis and the canons
of construction would constrain the judiciary and distinguish the quality of its decisionmaking from that of the legislature).
6 See supra notes 132 - 135 and accompanying text.
66
' See Scalia, supra note 105, at 1179.
167 See, e.g., David Millon, Objectivity and Democracy, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 24-27
DEPENDS ON TAXES

(1992) (indicating that judges' discretion is constrained by concerns about whether the
decision will be viewed by others in the legal community as a correct one).
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tive effect," judges are required to make their decisions on a retroactive
basis. 69 Like the canons of construction and stare decisis, retroactivity
produces more consistent decision-making over time and concomitantly
limits the range of alternatives available to the judge. 70 Fifth, unlike the
agencies, judges are not permitted to act in the absence of a case or controversy.17 ' Sixth, judges, unlike the agencies, are required to decide cases
incrementally, resolving only the issue presented and leaving for future
determination the larger issues that need not necessarily be addressed
immediately. 172 Both the case-or-controversy requirement and the incremental method tend to shape and limit the judge's perceptual field, thereby
73
further constraining the scope of the judge's decisionmaking discretion.1
168 See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208-209 (1988) (indicating
that in the absence of explicit statutory authorization, agencies are not permitted to issue
regulations
on a retroactive basis).
16 9 See Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993) (indicating that
in resolving questions of federal law, courts are required to give retroactive effect to their
decisions). Parenthetically, the constitutional obligation to make decisions on a retroactive
basis may even extend to the state courts, at least in the criminal context. See Fiore v.
White, 531 U.S. 225, 228 (2001) (leaving open the question whether due process requires
state courts to apply their construction of a criminal statute retroactively to convictions
previously secured when, if applied, the defendant would be exonerated). Retroactivity in
the criminal context may, however, conflict with the due process requirement that the state
provide notice of the nature of the prohibited conduct. See Rogers v. Tennessee, 121 S. Ct.
1693, 1698 (2001) (indicating that due process prohibits a criminal conviction secured
through retroactive application of a court's construction of a statute that is "unexpected and
indefensible" relative to the law in existence at the time of the conduct). This decision is
not inconsistent with the Court's emphasis in Harperon the constitutional requirement that
no discrimination should occur between similarly situated litigants, in that a criminal
defendant convicted prior to the court's construction of the statute and therefore without
pre-conduct notice of the elements of the crime is very differently situated from a defendant
convicted of engaging in the prohibited conduct after the court's construction. See Harper,
509 U.S. at 97.
170 See Harper,509 U.S. at 105-08 (Scalia, J., concurring) (indicating that the obligation to decide cases on a retroactive basis makes courts less inclined to deviate from precedent and distinguishes the interpretive function of the judiciary from the lawmaking function of the legislature).
171 See U.S. CONST. art. III.
172 Under Justice Scalia's view, however, the incrementalism of the common law

method is, paradoxically, in tension with judicial restraint. See Scalia, supra note 105, at
1179-80. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Foreward:Leaving Things Undecided, 110
HARv. L. REv. 6 (1996) (suggesting that judicial restraint requires that the judge clearly
establish the contours of the rule being applied so as to diminish the role of the judge's
policy reference in future cases).
73See Sunstein, Foreword,supra note 172, at 99-101.

36 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST JOURNAL
These differences cut two ways. On the one hand, the wider scope of
discretion that the agencies enjoy, as well as their enhanced ability to make
legislative-type judgments, creates more flexibility and, ultimately, efficiency in the face of changing circumstances. 74 On the other hand, the
constraints under which the courts operate are likely to reduce the influence of extraneous considerations such as adversarial bias or other forms
of institutional self-interest that may undermine the objectivity of some
agencies. In short, the premise that agencies and courts engage in the same
kind of interpretive activity does not withstand comparative analysis.
Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that there is an efficiency-objectivity tradeoff, and that Chevron'simplicit choice of efficiency over objectivity due to political accountability is not without its cost.

PART III. THE REENACTMENT DOCTRINE AND ITS
RELATIONSHIP TO CHEVRON
As discussed in Part I, the government did not issue the new GST
regulations until after it had first persuaded the Second Circuit in
Peterson17 51 that Congress ratified the version of the regulations issued
under the 1976 legislation when it reenacted the GST in 1986.176 Indeed,
in its brief, the government argued that the earlier "regulation received an
overall endorsement" from Congress.' And, in upholding the regulations,
the court specifically referenced the reenactment doctrine. 7 '
Generally, when the courts invoke the reenactment doctrine, they view
an interpretation as authoritative-as if Congress had enacted the interpretation-based on Congress' reenactment of the legislation under which
it was originally issued. 179 Yet, even though Congress reenacted the GST
17 4 The constitutional constraint on the courts that limits their authority

to decide cases

on other than a retroactive basis (see Harper, 509 U.S. at 97) is paradoxical, because
retroactivity generally is disfavored in the construction of statutes. See I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 121
S. Ct. 2271 (2001); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204,208 (1988). In some
circumstances, retroactivity is constitutionally unavailable to Congress. See Eastern Enter.
v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998) (indicating that Congress' imposition of liability on aretroactive basis is not constitutionally permissible because, in the view of four Justices, it would
constitute a taking, and in the view of a fifth Justice, it would violate due process).

175 78 F.3d at 795.
176 See id. at 799-801.
177 See Brief for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue at 30, Peterson, 78 F.3d at 795

(No. 95-4001).
171 See Peterson, 78 F.3d at 801.
179 See infra notes 189 - 191 and accompanying text. The doctrine may also be in-
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in 1986 and, in doing so, explicitly approved of the earlier regulations, the
Treasury has made the new regulations less friendly to taxpayers. 8I ° Part
III will focus on the relationship between the reenactment doctrine and
Chevron, ultimately raising the question of whether the new regulations are
valid given the reenactment doctrine.
As suggested in Part II, Chevron enhances agency authority in two
ways. First, Chevron requires the courts to defer to agency interpretations
when the statute is ambiguous and the interpretation is a reasonable one.
Second, it contemplates that agencies will find it necessary to change their
interpretations over time as circumstances evolve and such change, even if
brought about as a result of a change in administrations, may be entitled to
18
deferential review as well. 1
What is the relationship between Chevron and the reenactment doctrine? To the extent that the reenactment doctrine is available to the government as an argument in support of an agency interpretation, the doctrine
seems to be consistent with Chevron's pro-agency stance. On the other
hand, to the extent that the doctrine is used to prevent an agency from
changing an interpretation, it conflicts with Chevron's willingness to
embrace change.
A. Reenactment Doctrine Invoked By the Government
Consider first the relationship between Chevron and the use of the
reenactment doctrine when the government invokes it. If the original
statute is ambiguous, its reenactment makes a modest contribution, if any,
to the argument in favor of the interpretation, for the ambiguity itself
makes Chevron deference appropriate and thereby leads to a validation of
the interpretation (although the reenactment doctrine might nevertheless
have some significance in Chevron's second step, i.e., in determining
182
whether the interpretation reasonably resolves the statutory ambiguity).
In other words, although application of the doctrine is consistent with
Chevron in that it results in validating the agency's interpretation, 83 Chev
voked when the statute under which the interpretation has been issued remains unamended.
See U.S. v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 121 S. Ct. 1433, 1445 (2001) (quoting Cottage
Sav. Ass'n
v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554, 561 (1991)).
180 See supra notes 38, 45, 72-75 81-89 and accompanying text.
181 See supra note 130.
182 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (1984).
183 Note, however, the strength of the inference that Congress intended ratification is
somewhat debatable when Congress simply reenacts the statute without affirmatively
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ron alone would produce that outcome without any assistance from the
reenactment doctrine.'
In contrast, when the original and reenacting
statutes are unambiguous and cannot accommodate the agency's interpretation, the doctrine may have more importance. On the one hand, Chevron
seems to preclude a court from utilizing the doctrine to uphold an interpretation contrary to unambiguous statutory language." 5 On the other hand,
a court might be reluctant to invalidate an interpretation when Congress
reenacted the statute after having been made aware of the interpretation,
irrespective of the clarity of the statutory language. 86 On the whole, the
reenactment doctrine as a government argument in support of an interpretation has rather meager utility when the statute is ambiguous, but perhaps is
more useful when the statute is unambiguous.
indicating its intent with regard to the interpretation. See Coverdale, supra note 99, at 79
(arguing that reenactment is a "weak indication" that Congress intends to ratify an existing
agencyinterpretation).
I Prior to Chevron, the reenactment doctrine had the potential to make a greater
contribution when the government invoked it to support its interpretation of an ambiguous
statute. See, e.g., Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 24-25 (1969) (indicating that
reenactment could strengthen the validity of a regulation).
185 For a pre-Chevron case in which the Court refused to invoke the reenactment
doctrine because it concluded that the pre-reenactment regulation was contrary to the clear
meaning of the statute, see Leary, 395 U.S. at 24-25. See also Comm'r v. Acker, 361 U.S.
87, 93 (1959). However, even in the face of a clear statute an interpretation might be
upheld under the reenactment doctrine if evidence exists of congressional consideration.
See Eskridge, supranote 162, at 82-83 (implying negatively that Congress' awareness of the
interpretation could lead to a decision upholding it).
86 The Supreme Court has disclosed some willingness to uphold an interpretation
if
Congress has considered a statute and decided not to enact legislation overruling it, even
though the interpretation might otherwise be viewed as contrary to the legislation. See Solid
Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 169-70
(2001) (intimating that when Congress' failure to overturn an agency construction indicates
Congressional intent to validate the construction, the "plain text" of the statute might be
required to yield to that construction); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474
U.S. 121, 137 (1985) (indicating that a clear showing that Congress had considered an
agency's construction and chose not to overturn it may constitute "at least some evidence
of the reasonableness of that construction"). Cf Eskridge, supra note 162, at 82-83 (citing
Leary, 395 U.S. at 24-25 for the notion that the Court might be less inclined to conclude
Congress had considered the interpretation and ratified it when it is contrary to clear statutory language); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 694 n. 11 (1980) (refusing to uphold agency
interpretation contrary to clear statutory language in the absence of a more compelling basis
for inferring that Congress intended ratification). Whether the Court would be similarly

inclined to uphold an interpretation otherwise at odds with the statute on the ground that
Congress had reenacted it-as opposed to deciding that new legislation should not be
enacted because it approved of the interpretation-is, of course, a different matter.
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B. Reenactment Doctrine Invoked Against the Government
Consider now the use of the reenactment doctrine against the government. If an agency issues an interpretation under the original statute but
then seeks to change its position after reenactment of the statute, the doctrine, if successfully invoked, will prevent the agency from making the
change. Precluding an agency from reconsidering its position in this way
constitutes a significant constraint on agency discretion and denies the
agency the ability to respond to evolving circumstances." 7 However,
agency discretion is no less constrained when Congress incorporates its
scheme in unambiguous statutory language.
When the original and reenacting statutes are ambiguous and would
both accommodate the pre-reenactment interpretation, one could make a
plausible case for invoking the doctrine against the government. 8 Or even
when the statutory language unambiguously conflicts with the interpretation, a case could possibly be made for using the doctrine if there is clear
evidence that Congress endorsed the interpretation.'8 9 After all, if Con
187

See, e.g., Bell Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Comm'r, 40 F.3d 224, 229 (7th Cir.

1994) indicating that flexibility is a crucial underpinning of administrative law).
As will be discussed, as a result of Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass 'n, 463 U.S. at 29,
litigants seeking to invoke the doctrine against the government may bear a more onerous
burden than the government does when it invokes the doctrine in support of an interpretation. See infra notes 197-199 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, courts have continued
to indicate that the doctrine can be invoked against the government when the reenacting
statute is ambiguous and could accommodate the pre-reenactment interpretation. See, e.g.,
Peoples Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n of Sidney v. Comm'r, 948 F.2d 289, 302-03 (6th Cir.
1991) (intimating that application of the doctrine against the government might be appropriate in the case of an ambiguous statute if evidence exists that Congress had noted or been
aware of the interpretation at the time of reenactment); Pac. First Fed. Sav. Bank v.
Comm'r, 961 F.2d 800, 807 (9th Cir. 1992) (implying application of the reenactment
doctrine against the government would be appropriate in the case of an ambiguous statute
if evidence exists that Congress had considered the interpretation); Cent. Pa. Say. Ass'n v.
Comm'r, 104 T.C. 384, 396-97 (1995) (indicating that, if the statute is ambiguous and clear
evidence exists that Congress had considered the interpretation, finding an implied intent to
freeze the interpretation in place would be appropriate); Bell Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v.
Comm'r, 40 F.3d 224, 230 (7th Cir. 1994) (implying that in the context of an ambiguous
statute it would be appropriate to apply the reenactment doctrine against the government if
there were evidence that Congress scrutinized the interpretation).
189 The Supreme Court has indicated that where Congress decides not to overrule an
interpretation, the Court might uphold the interpretation under the reenactment doctrine
even if it could be viewed as contrary to clear statutory language. See supra note 186.
Perhaps this line of reasoning could be extended to apply when the doctrine is invoked
against the government. However, such an extension might be foreclosed by the Court's
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gress was aware of the interpretation and found it was inconsistent with the
reenacting statute, presumably Congress would not have adopted the new
legislation in silence, but would have disclosed its discomfort with the
interpretation. However, one could also argue that Congress' silence
indicates Congressional intent to ratify the interpretation, but, at the same
time, leave the agency with discretion to make modifications. Yet another
reading that would support a rejection of the reenactment doctrine is that
Congress was unaware of the statutory interpretation, suggesting that
Congress intended the agency retain its ordinary discretion under Chevron
to resolve any ambiguity in the reenacting legislation. Ultimately, whenever the doctrine is invoked against the government, the question must be
whether Congress intended not merely to embrace the interpretation, but
also to preclude the agency from making any post-enactment alterations. 190
This, in turn, leads to the normative question of how to fashion a default rule. How, in other words, should the courts presumptively interpret
legislation where Congress fails to make its intent explicit with regard to
a pre-reenactment interpretation? 9' On the one hand, the flexibility made
decision in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'. See infra notes 197-198 and accompanying text.
190 The application of the reenactment doctrine with regard to judicial interpretations
is very similar to its application in the context of an agency interpretations (see Eskridge,
supranote 162, at 69), which can produce confusion. When the doctrine is applied to ratify
a pre-reenactment judicial interpretation, the effect is to freeze that interpretation in place
and to deny the courts the ability to modify it. See, e.g., Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332,
339 (1969) (acknowledging that the application of the reenactment doctrine to a judicial
interpretation "freezes" it in place). Perhaps, when courts have failed to distinguish between using the doctrine to ratify an agency interpretation and using it to freeze an agency
interpretation in place (see infra notes 200-204 and accompanying text) they simply have
overlooked the difference between applying the doctrine to a judicial interpretation (when
a freeze necessarily results) and to an administrative interpretation (when Congress might
intend that, as an alternative to creating a freeze, the agency retain discretion to make postreenactment modifications).
191 A second, related question is whether Congress should be assumed to ratify
or to
freeze in place an interpretation outstanding at the time of reenactment if not brought to its
attention. See AFL-CIO v. Brock, 835 F.2d 912, 916 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (indicating that
although courts often have alluded to a presumption that Congress was aware of a prereenactment interpretation, they typically have done so in the context of a ratification
argument made by the government but not when the doctrine has been invoked against the
government). For a suggestion that the Supreme Court usually makes an effort to determine
whether Congress was aware of an interpretation at the time of reenactment before finding
that it has been ratified, see Eskridge, supra note 162, at 80-81. In terms of efficiency, it
would seem inappropriate to impose on Congress the burden to investigate and consider
every outstanding interpretation before reenacting legislation-thus suggesting that, if
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available when agencies are permitted to make changes as circumstances
dictate suggests it would be more efficient to apply a default rule that
allows interpretations to be modified after reenactment. Also, from a
public choice perspective, 9 2 one can argue that if Congress fails to freeze
an interpretation in place, permitting the agency to alter its position is
preferable because rewarding Congress for its ambiguity is inappropriate
or even counterproductive. 93 On the other hand, the concern that agencies
might alter their interpretations opportunistically supports a default rule
that would preclude post-reenactment modifications.'94
The development of the law on this issue has not been linear. Long
before its decision in Chevron, the Court, alluding to a concern about
constraining agency discretion, concluded that the doctrine could not be
invoked against the government. 9 However, several years before its
decision in Chevron, the Court retreated and applied the doctrine after
finding in the legislative history accompanying the reenacting legislation
an intent to freeze in place an agency interpretation. 96 Then, shortly after
Chevron, the Court in Motor Vehicle ManufacturersAss 'n v. State Farm

Congress is not aware of an interpretation, reenactment should not result in ratification.
192 In the tax context, it has been suggested that the legislative deficiencies identified

by the9?ublic choice theorists are particularly acute. See supra note 142.
Ambiguity tends to lower the cost of rent-seeking special interest groups, thus
creating more legislation driven by the narrow interests of the few at the expense of the
many. See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory
Interpretation:An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223, 252-53 (1986) (explaining that statutory ambiguity reduces the cost of special-interest legislation). Cf Aleinikoff,
supra note 126, at 25 (indicating that the courts' adoption of rules designed to encourage
Congress to be less ambiguous would possibly impose "huge costs on a legislature too busy
to redraft 'unclear' statutes"). In addition, when Congress has been ambiguous, Congress
likely simply failed to reach any agreement on the issue. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived
Questfor the Original Understanding,60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980). For an argument from
the public choice perspective against applying reenactment doctrine whenever the prereenactment interpretation favors a special-interest group, see Eskridge, supra note 162, at
107-08.
194If, as suggested, the potential for the government to act opportunistically through
the issuance of regulations is diminished by denying deference when this occurs (see supra
Part VI) a default rule requiring affirmative evidence of Congress' intent to freeze an
interpretation in place before the doctrine could be invoked against the government would
be sensible.
19 5 See Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90, 100 (1939); Helvering v. Reynolds,
(1941); Morrissey v. Comm'r, 296 U.S. 344, 355 (1935).
313 U.S.
196 428, 432
See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 282-84 (1974).
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Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,' 97 qualified its approach yet again.
Emphasizing Chevron 's willingness to permit agencies to deviate from
earlier interpretations, the Court distinguished between use of the doctrine
by the government and against the government and indicated that it would
be more demanding of litigants seeking to invoke it in the latter context.'9 8
The Court's retreat is not surprising. After all, Chevron effected an

expansion in agency authority not only by creating greater latitude for
agencies to change their interpretations, but also by granting increased
deference. The reenactment doctrine, when applied against the govern-

ment, potentially conflicts with both of these Chevron strands. The spirit
of the pro-change strand is undermined if courts apply the doctrine to
prevent the agency from reconsidering its original position. Likewise, the
spirit of the pro-deference strand is frustrated if the agency is so constrained. In short, although this tension between Chevron and the reenactment doctrine requires further clarification, one can safely conclude that
ardent proponents of Chevron will be strongly inclined to resolve it by
requiring rather clear evidence of anti-modification intent as a predicate for
invoking the doctrine against the government.'"
Recently, in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,2°° the Su197 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
198

See id. at 45 (stating that "in the cases before us, even an unequivocal ratifica-

tion-short of statutory incorporation-of the passive restraint standard would not connote
approval or disapproval of an agency's later decision to rescind the regulation").
199 See Bankers Life and Cas. Co. v. U.S., 142 F.3d 973,988 (7th Cir. 1998) (indicating that the strength of the reenactment doctrine, though in a context in which the government sought to invoke it, is somewhat undercut by Chevron's pro-change strand as emphasized by the Court in Smiley, 517 U.S. at 740; Peoples Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n of Sidney,
948 F.2d at 302 (intimating that Chevron's pro-change strand weakens the argument for
applying the reenactment doctrine against the government); Brock, 835 F.2d at 916 (requiring strong affirmative evidence that Congress intended to freeze an interpretation before
invoking the doctrine against the government, and citing Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90, the
pre-Chevroncase indicating that reenactment is never appropriate against the government);
Massachusetts v. Sec'y of Health and Human Seres., 899 F.2d 53, 61 (1st Cir. 1990)
(indicating that more than Congress' ratification of an interpretation is necessary before an
interpretation is frozen in place), vacated by 500 U.S. 949 (1991); Cent. Pa. Say. Ass'n. v.
Commissioner, 104 T.C. at 390 (acknowledging that Chevron gives agencies the flexibility
to alter their interpretations). However, some courts continue to indicate a willingness to
apply the reenactment doctrine against the government, even in the absence of any particularized showing that Congress intended to effect a freeze of the pre-reenactment interpretation. See supra note 185.
200 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
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preme Court invoked the reenactment doctrine against the government,
freezing in place a prior agency interpretation. The tension between the
doctrine and Chevron surfaced in the interaction between the majority and
dissenting opinions, with the majority permitting the doctrine to trump
Chevron's pro-change principle and the dissent choosing Chevron over the
doctrine. The majority applied the reenactment doctrine against the government in a relatively uncomplicated context and, as will be suggested,
did so gratuitously. Moreover, the Court's analysis sheds little light on the
kind of evidence Congress must provide before a court is justified in finding a freeze was intended.
In Brown & Williamson, the FDA originally had interpreted its governing statute as precluding the agency from regulating tobacco. Subsequently, Congress enacted various pieces of legislation regulating the sale
of tobacco. The FDA then abandoned its original interpretation and took
the position that its governing statute conferred upon it the necessary
regulatory authority. The issue before the Court was whether the FDA
exceeded its authority in asserting regulatoryjurisdiction. Both the majority2O' and the dissent2" 2 appeared to be in agreement as to the proper framework for determining the validity of the FDA's new interpretation: if the
assertion of jurisdiction was contrary to the statute's unambiguous mandate, Chevron would require that the interpretation be invalidated.
The majority then examined the FDA's governing statute and the
tobacco-regulating legislation Congress enacted over the years. If the
governing statute was construed as permitting the assertion ofjurisdiction,
the majority reasoned that the FDA necessarily would be required to ban
the sale of tobacco entirely. 203 Yet, the majority found that the tobaccoregulating legislation, enacted subsequent to the governing statute, clearly
and unambiguously contemplated the continued sale of tobacco. 204 Thus,
the FDA's assertion ofjurisdiction and the complete ban that would necessarily result could not be sustained.
Given the majority's conclusion in Brown & Williamson that there was
a conflict between the FDA's assertion of jurisdiction and the clear
tobacco-regulating legislation, one might have anticipated that a reference
201 See id. at

132-33.

202

See id. at 171 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

203

See id. at 137.

204 see id.
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to the Chevron notion that an agency cannot override a clear statute would
suffice. However, the Brown & Williamson majority expanded its analysis
to include the reenactment doctrine. The majority observed that Congress
had enacted the tobacco-regulating legislation against the backdrop of the
FDA's original interpretation that it did not have jurisdiction. Relying on
one of its reenactment decisions, Bob Jones University. v. United States, 20 5
the majority concluded that Congress intended to ratify the FDA's original
interpretation and, in effect, freeze it in place. 21 However, this use of the
doctrine was gratuitous. The tobacco-regulating legislation, the majority
concluded, unambiguously contemplated that the FDA would not have
jurisdiction. Under the Chevron framework, an agency interpretation in
conflict with such unambiguous legislation cannot be permitted to stand.
Thus, the legislation should have been viewed as a bar to the FDA's assertion of jurisdiction, making any examination of the prior interpretation or
the reenactment doctrine unnecessary.
It is difficult to infer from the Brown & Williamson majority's willingness to apply the reenactment doctrine against the FDA the circumstances
in which the Court will be prepared to invoke the doctrine against the
government in future cases. After all, given the majority's view of the
tobacco-regulating legislation, the case was a relatively easy one in which
to examine the relationship between Chevron and the reenactment doctrine. Once the Court found the legislation clearly precluded the assertion
ofjurisdiction, the agency's authority to deviate from its original interpretation could not be sustained, thus making for an easy, as well as gratuitous, application of the doctrine. In contrast, when the reenacting legislation is ambiguous, the analysis is more complicated. The Court, however,
did not address the issues that arise with regard to an ambiguous reenactment: whether the doctrine is available against the government in this
context; and, if so, how clearly Congress must express its intent in order to
achieve this outcome. 0 7
205

461 U.S. 574 (1983). More accurately, Bob Jonesdid not involve reenactment but,

rather, acquiescence. In Bob Jones, the Court concluded that Congress had ratified a
revenue ruling when it failed to pass a bill that would have overturned the ruling. See id. at
599-601. This rather expansive variation on the reenactment doctrine apparently is reserved
for special situations. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 170 n.5 (2001) (reading Congress' failure to pass legislation as
acquiescence only when the evidence is "overwhelming").
constituting
206
See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 156.
207 See Brock, 835 F.2d at 915 (requiring strong affirmative indication of Congress'
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Because the majority in Brown & Williamson did not consider these
issues, it failed to address an important distinction. In invoking the
reenactment doctrine, the majority relied on Bob Jones. However, in Bob
Jones the government invoked the doctrine to validate an agency interpretation, not against the government to constrain an agency's authority to
modify an interpretation.2 8 Did the Brown & Williamson majority intend
to imply that the same level of evidence concerning Congress' intent is
required to invoke the doctrine against the government as is required when
the government invokes the doctrine? Or did the Brown & Williamson
majority simply fail to appreciate that, unlike the case under consideration,
Bob Jones involved the use of the reenactment doctrine to validate the
agency's interpretation?
Whatever one might make of this, the Brown & Williamson majority
certainly made clear that, even under Chevron, the Court can invoke the
reenactment doctrine against the government in order to constrain
change.2 9 The Brown & Williamson dissent, on the other hand, maintained
that, given Chevron's pro-change principle, the Court should permit the
FDA to alter its approach.2"' The majority did not dispute the validity of
the pro-change principle but instead implicitly concluded that it was inapplicable because of its determination that Congress had intended to ratify
the FDA's original interpretation. Therefore, although the dissent apparently took the view that the pro-change principle preempted application of
the reenactment doctrine against the government,2 ' the majority took the
contrary view that the doctrine can be invoked against the government

intent to freeze an agency interpretation when the legislation is ambiguous). See also Bell
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. at 274-75 (1974).
See Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 899 F.2d at 61 (indicating that Bob Jones
involved the use of the reenactment doctrine to uphold an agency interpretation and that, in
Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 45, the Court refused to conclude that reenactment had the
effect of freezing in place an agency interpretation). In Motor Vehicle Mfrs., the Court, after
distinguishing Bob Jones, concluded that "short of statutory incorporation" the agency
should be permitted to depart from its original interpretation, with the validity of the new
interpretation determined under the arbitrary and capricious standard. See 463 U.S. at 45.
"209See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 157-58. For a pre-Chevron case in which the
Court constrained the government through use of the reenactment doctrine, see Bell Aerospace210
Co., 416 U.S. at 274-75.
See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 186 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
211 The dissenters may have overstated their position in that they might well be prepared to permit the doctrine to trump the principle if clear evidence that Congress intended
to effect a freeze were present. See id. at 190.
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without violating the pro-change principle. Unfortunately, both the majority and the dissent failed to fully clarify their view of the relationship
between the pro-change principle and the reenactment doctrine.
Curiously, neither the Brown & Williamson majority nor the dissent
considered the Court's prior treatment of the applicability of the
reenactment doctrine against the government. As previously suggested, in
212 the Court had staked out its position on
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers,
the issue by indicating that Congress should not be understood as precluding an agency from changing its position merely because it has ratified an
agency interpretation, unless, in the Court's words, the reenacting legislation effects a "statutory incorporation."2'13 Although the Court did not
elaborate on the meaning of this phrase, it seems to contemplate a presumption in favor of permitting the agency to change its position in the
214
absence of an affirmative indication by Congress of a contrary intent.
However, in Davis v. U.S., 215 a tax case decided six years after Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers, the Court appeared more willing to apply the
doctrine against the government.216 In Brown & Williamson, both the
majority 7 and the dissent,21 surprisingly, cited Motor Vehicle Manufacturers for the pro-change principle but neither opinion made any reference
to the language presumptively disfavoring use of the doctrine against the
government. Nor was any reference made to Davis or to the Court's earlier
treatment of the issue.219
How then should the Brown & Williamson majority be understood?
One possible reading is that the majority intended to strengthen the
reenactment doctrine as applied against the government. There are, however, alternative readings that would render the doctrine less expansive.
After all, the Brown & Williamson Court found the legislation unambigu212 463 U.S. at 42.
213 See id. at 45.
214

Such an indication of contrary intent perhaps could be found in legislative history.

See, e.g., BellAerospace Co., 416 U.S. at 289 (precluding agency from making a change
after examining legislative history).
215 495 U.S. 472 (1990).
216
See id. at 485 (applying the reenactment doctrine at the government's request but
noting that "the Service may retain some flexibility to adopt other interpretations in the
21f See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 157.
218

2 19

See id. at 189 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
See supranotes 197-195 and accompanying text.
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ous, 2 20 thus leaving unclear whether the Court is prepared to invoke the

doctrine against the government in the context of an ambiguous reenacting
statute. Perhaps when the issue arises again, the Court will seek to limit
the majority opinion by claiming that the evidence that Congress intended
to effect a freeze was overwhelming-tantamount to an incorporation. Or
perhaps the Court will ultimately declare that in the majority's haste to
bolster its analysis, it simply made a mistake in invoking the reenactment
doctrine in the first place.
C. The Generation-Skipping Regulations and Reenactment
Thus, because of the distinction between the use of the reenactment
doctrine by the government and against the government, the mere fact that
the government successfully invoked it in Peterson221 does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that the earlier regulations thereby became unalterable. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that the courts will view Congress'
explicit endorsement of the regulations as sufficient to freeze them in
place, making the new regulations invalid. In any event, in normative
terms, Congress' endorsement of the earlier regulations, even if viewed as
falling short of the standard for applying the reenactment doctrine against
the government, as well as the adversarial origin of the new regulations
should certainly weigh against the validity of the changes. Under Chevron,
however, these considerations are irrelevant.
After first examining the deference issue in the context of revenue
rulings and ambiguous regulations in Parts IV and V, in Part VI the argument will be made that the validity of regulations should be assessed under
the so-called Skidmore framework.' This shift away from Chevron would
make the courts less deferential and more circumspect, allowing various
kinds of considerations to be taken into account that are out of bounds
under Chevron.
PART IV. REVENUE RULINGS AND DEFERENCE

The transformation in the courts' deference to agency interpretations
has not been limited to regulations. Traditionally, courts did not view
revenue rulings as legally authoritative, and they received no deference,

220 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S.
221 78 F.3d 795 (2d Cir.1996).
222

See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 134.

at 155-56.
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whether they were invoked by223 or against the government. 2 4 A significant shift has occurred, however, in the post-Chevron years. 5 Although
the Supreme Court remains unwilling to commit itself on the issue, 6
revenue rulings have been enjoying deference, with the level of deference
beginning to crystallize.227 This is true not only when the government
invokes a ruling. The courts have begun treating ruling-based arguments
advanced by taxpayers with more deference as well. =8 The effect of this
alteration in the authoritativeness of revenue rulings is twofold: an expansion of the government's authority where it is the government invoking a
ruling, and a contraction where it is the taxpayer.
In Davis v. United States,229 where the government invoked the reve-

nue ruling, the Court gave it "considerable weight," but in doing so emphasized two elements: the ruling's longstanding status, and the reenactment
of the statute after it was issued. 230 This, of course, left unclear whether
these elements were crucial to the Court's decision to give the ruling such
deference 23 ' and whether Davis' deferential standard of review was the
equivalent of Chevron deference was also left unclear.232

223 See Biddle v. Comm'r, 302 U.S. 573, 582 (1938) (citing Helvering v. New York
Trust Co., 292 U.S. 455, 467-68 (1934)); Coverdale, supra note 99, at 81; Linda Galler,
Emerging Standards ForJudicialReview of IRS Revenue Rulings, 72 B.U. L. REV. 841,
849-50
224(1992).
See Dickman v. Comm'r, 465 U.S. 330 (1984); Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S.
68, 73 (1 9 6 5); Automobile Club of Michigan v. Comm'r, 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
22 See Coverdale, supra note 99, at 80-84; Galler, supra note 108, at 1038.
226
See United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 121 S. Ct. 1433, 1444 (2001)
(indicating that, "We need not decide whether the [R]evenue [R]ulings themselves are
entitled
227 to deference").
See Coverdale, supra note99, at 82-84; Galler, supra notel08, at 1038. However,
in the Tax Court, revenue rulings do not enjoy deference (at least when invoked by the
government). See Alumax Inc. v. Comm'r, 109 T.C. 133, 163 n. 12 (1997), aff'd, 165 F.3d
822 (1I th Cir. 1999); Galler supra note 108, at 1083.
28 See Weisbart v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 222 F.3d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 2000);
Estate of McLendon v. Comm'r, 135 F.3d 1017, 1023, 1025 (5th Cir. 1998); Estate of Rapp
v. Comm'r, 140 F.3d 1211, 1216-18 (9th Cir. 1998); Cascade Designs, Inc. v. Comm'r, 79
T.C.M. (CCH) 1542, 1553-54 (2000) (indicating that revenue rulings do not receive deference in the Tax Court when invoked by the government, but they are binding when they
contain a government concession).
229
230 495 U.S. 472 (1990).
See id. at 484.
231 See Coverdale, supra note 99, at 88; Galler, Emerging,supra note 223, at 870
(discussing the deference that the Court conferred upon the ruling).
232 In Cottage Say. Ass'n. v. Comrnm'r, 499 U.S. 554 (1991), the Court speculated that
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Five years later, although in the context of a ruling invoked by the
taxpayer rather than the government, all of the Justices agreed, in Commissionerv. Schleier,233 that rulings were not to be viewed as having the same
effect as a regulation.2 34 Although not entirely clear, this holding certainly
suggested that a ruling was not entitled to Chevron deference (i.e., the
controlling deference regulations enjoy). However, the dissent argued that
rulings were entitled to "substantial" deference (citing Davis).2 35 The
majority, concluding that the ruling could not be sustained because it was
contrary to the plain meaning of the statute,236 found no need to articulate
the level of deference rulings were entitled to receive, and, therefore, did
not respond to the dissent on this point.
In two recent decisions, Christensen237 and Mead,231 the Court made
clear that courts should utilize a two-tier framework to determine the validity of agency interpretations.239 Under this framework, selecting which of
two levels of deference is appropriate depends on whether Congress intended to permit the agency to exercise lawmaking responsibilities, and, if
so, whether Congress intended that the responsibilities could be exercised
through the particular type of interpretation issued by the agency. 2' When
a court concludes that Congress intended that the agency exercise lawmaking responsibility and that it have the authority to do so in the type of
interpretation at issue, controlling (Chevron) deference is appropriate. 24'
However, when a court reaches the contrary conclusion, the interpretation
is entitled to less deference under the so-called Skidmore standard.242
The Skidmore standard, under which tax regulations previously had
the government's failure to seek deference for its revenue rulings was attributable to the fact
that they were issued after the transaction at issue had been consummated. See id. at 563
n.7. The Court also cited Nat'l Muffler, 440 U.S. at 483-484, for the proposition that
longstanding revenue rulings that maintain a consistent position across a variety of fact
patterns are entitled to deference. See id.
233 515 U.S. 323 (1995).
2 34
See id. at 336 n.8, 345.
235 See id. at 345.
236 See id. at 336 n.8.
237 529 U.S. at 576.
238 121 S. Ct. 2164.
239 See Merrill & Hickman supra note 103, at 836 (citing Christensenand discussing
two levels
of deference, Chevron and Skidmore).
240
See Mead, 121 S. Ct. at 2172-73.
241 See id.

242 See Skidmore, 323

U.S. at 134.
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been analyzed,243 requires courts to defer to a persuasive interpretation. 2"
In determining whether the interpretation is persuasive (and therefore
binding), the courts must make a contextualizedjudgment based on various
factors that would be largely irrelevant under Chevron, including inter
alia:24 5 the thoroughness of the agency's decision-making process, the
consistency with which the agency has maintained its position, and the
validity of the agency's reasoning (which, unlike the first two factors, is
relevant under Chevron).2" In applying persuasiveness as the standard,
both Christensen and Mead could possibly be understood as suggesting
that courts remain free to reject any interpretation with which they disagree. However, when these decisions are read against the backdrop of the
language referenced in Skidmore, such an understanding becomes untenable. For example, consider a case in which the statute is ambiguous and
would accommodate either of two constructions. If the agency adopted
one of these constructions after thorough and logical analysis and then
remained consistently faithful to it, Skidmore likely would require a court
to defer to the agency's construction despite the Court's preference for the
alternative.2 47
Whether the Court will definitively conclude that courts should analyze revenue rulings under Skidmore, rather than Chevron, remains to be
seen. But given that all of the Justices agreed in Schleier that rulings do
not enjoy the same authoritative effect as regulations (Chevron deference) 248 and that Christensenand Mead make clear that interpretations are
entitled to either Chevron or Skidmore deference (with no intermediate
243 See id. at
244

140.

Mead, 121 S. Ct. at 2167 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (1944)); Christensen,
529 U.S. at 587 (citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,256-58 (1991) as well
as Skidmore).
245 See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
246 See supra note 244.
247 The passage in Skidmore referenced by the Court in Christensenand Mead requires
the courts to seek "guidance" from agency interpretations because of the "experience and
informed judgment" agencies contribute to the deliberative process. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at
140. Moreover, in fleshing out the level of deference contemplated, the passage refers to
the Court's prior decisions in which tax regulations had been given "considerable and in
some cases decisive weight." Id. Thus, under the Skidmore standard, agency interpretations
cannot be set aside simply because the court reaches a contrary conclusion on its own
analysis. Indeed, to read Christensen as permitting a court to reject an interpretation with
which it disagrees is tantamount to a complete denial of deference, which contradicts the
Skidmore
248 passage.
515 U.S.323 (1995).
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level of deference), the Court likely will eventually clarify that Skidmore
is the appropriate framework for analyzing the validity of rulings.249 If so,
Davis' "considerable weight" standard could be understood as a
contextualized judgment about the ruling's persuasiveness, with its longstanding status and the statute's reenactment after Congress issued it explaining the heightened level of deference the Court applied.250
If Skidmore does become the governing framework, the lower courts
may well need to reconsider the formulations they employ in evaluating the
authoritative effect of rulings invoked by the government. 25' The circuit
courts have been applying what might be called an intermediate level of
deference, not as much as Chevron's controlling deference, but more than
Skidmore's persuasive deference (perhaps reading Davis as imposing a per
In Mead, the Court concluded that Chevron deference may be appropriate even
when an interpretation is issued without notice and comment. See 121 S. Ct. at 2173.
Revenue rulings (issued without notice and comment, see, e.g., Galler, supra note 223, at
890) might therefore become eligible for Chevron deference. At the same time, the Court's
recent refusal to specify whether Chevron or Skidmore applies to revenue rulings, in Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 121 S. Ct. at 1444, suggests that the Court was somewhat
uncertain, and perhaps conflicted, about the issue. Nevertheless, as indicated in the text, it
seems more likely the Court will establish ultimately that Skidmore governs in this
context-although under the mode of analysis favored by Justice Scalia which was rejected
by the majority in Mead, revenue rulings would presumably be entitled to analysis under
Chevron because they represent the authoritative view of the agency reached after full
deliberation. See Mead, 121 S. Ct. at 2179-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Indeed, in the
aftermath of the Court's decision in Christensen, the circuit courts have begun applying
Skidmore to revenue rulings. See, e.g., Dominion Res., Inc. v. U.S., 219 F.3d 359,366 (4th
Cir. 2000) (citing Christensen in support of its conclusion that revenue rulings are entitled
to much less than Chevron deference); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Comm'r, 224 F.3d 874, 886
(8th Cir. 2000) (indicating that a revenue ruling is entitled to persuasive deference, citing to
an earlier decision in this circuit, Oetting v. United States, 712 F.2d 358, 362 (8th Cir.
1983), rather than Christensen); Matz v. Household Int'l Tax Reduction Inv. Plan, 265 F.3d
572 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2545 (2001) (intimating that revenue rulings
should be analyzed under the Skidmore framework); American Express Co. v. U.S., 262
F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (intimating to the same effect).
250 In setting forth its deference formulation, the Skidmore Court indicated that considerable weight, or even decisive weight in some circumstances, would be appropriate. 323
U.S. at 140. Compare Cottage Sav. Ass'n, 499 U.S. at 563 n.7 (suggesting a level of
deference with regard to revenue rulings that one could view as consistent with Skidmore,
e.g., deference is perhaps inappropriate because the rulings were issued after the transaction), with Smiley, 517 U.S. at 741 (concluding that in terms of Chevron deference, the fact
that the government issued the regulation during the litigation was not relevant).
251 See Dominion, 219 F.3d at 366 (questioning the importance of Christensen in terms
of revenue rulings).
249
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se rule of intermediate deference that is insensitive to context). Thus, if
Skidmore is held applicable to rulings, a cutback in the level of deference
will likely ensue in the circuit courts. Yet, it is also possible that any
alteration in the deference formulation as a result of applying Skidmore
might have little impact in these courts. Given the pressure of other matters, generalist judges lacking tax expertise may well find sufficient flexibility in the Skidmore standard to justify adopting the position taken in a
ruling without engaging in a complete and independent analysis.25 a

The Tax Court, unlike the circuit courts, has adhered to the traditional
view that rulings are entitled to no deference. 254 Although reconsideration
of this view would seem necessary in light of Christensen and Mead, the
Tax Court is not likely to undertake this task eagerly. One way of understanding the court's no-deference stance is as a reflection of its own sense
of expertise and, perhaps, "institutional ego." If this description of the
court's approach is correct, the court presumably will resist taking
Christensen and Mead seriously. The Tax Court could express this resis-

tance in either of two ways: (1) by misreading Skidmore to require no
deference whenever its own analysis leads to a conclusion that is inconsistent with the ruling, or (2) by adopting its own conclusion on the substantive issue and then framing it in terms that are compatible with the
Skidmore standard. The court has already intimated an inclination to take
the first of these two paths.2 55
252

See, e.g., Coverdale, supra note 99, at 82 (indicating that in recent years, in the

circuit courts, revenue rulings have been receiving "significant deference").
253 See, e.g., Del Commercial Props., Inc. v. Comm'r, 251 F.3d 210, 214 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (giving Skidmore deference to revenue rulings, citing Christensen, and upholding
them after making a conclusory reference to the plain meaning of the Code as informed by
an early Supreme Court decision); Rebecca K. Crown Income Charitable Fund v. Comm'r,
8 F.3d 571, 576 (7th Cir. 1993) (indicating that "generalist judges should be loath to lay
down the law on the question without the Treasury's view, which has not yet crystallized").
See also Aprill, supra note 107, at 88 (indicating that generalist judges prefer deference).
On the other hand, generalist federal judges arguably tend to dislike an expansive conception of deference because it threatens their self-image. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political
Control Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevron and
Mistretta, 57 U. Cin. L. REv. 481, 516 (1990) (discussing judicial bias against deference).
See also Matz, 265 F.3d at 575-76 (applying Skidmore and nevertheless rejecting the government's argument).
254 See, e.g., Sklar, Greenstein & Scheer, P.C. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 135, 142 (1999).
See also Dominion Res., Inc. v. U.S., 219 F.3d 359,366 (4th Cir. 2000) (indicating that the
Tax Court gives no deference to revenue rulings).
255 In Johnson v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 210 (2000), the court's first encounter with
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In those cases where the government is able to prevail because its
ruling-based argument is reviewed deferentially, its authority is obviously
expanded. Given the deference rulings enjoy (though perhaps a cutback
will occur as a result of Christensenand Mead2 56), it would not be surpris-

ing if the government sought to expand its authority further by incorporating arguments it contemplates making in future litigation in a present
ruling and then claiming the ruling as precedent.257 Moreover, as a practical matter, the government may frequently be able to secure controlling
deference for its rulings, rather than mere Skidmore deference. For as
discussed in Part V, the Supreme Court has made clear that an agency's
interpretation resolving an ambiguity in its regulations is determinative
"unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." 258 Indeed,
the Court recently deferred to the government's construction of an ambiguous regulation on the ground that longstanding rulings had adopted the
same construction. 2 9 Because so many tax disputes revolve around the
meaning of the regulations, and since it is likely that, as a result of ChevChristensen,the court dismissed a ruling-based argument advanced by the taxpayer on the
ground that rulings are not binding. See id. at 224. Interestingly, after reiterating its traditional no-deference stance, the court cited Christensen with the following parenthetical
description: "the interpretation that an agency reaches without formal notice and comment
rulemaking is entitled to 'respect' only when it has the 'power to persuade."' Id. See also
McLaulin v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 255,263-64 (2000) (alluding to the general rule that rulings
do not receive any deference, the Court indicated that taking into account the longstanding
nature of the ruling was not necessary because it agreed with the ruling's conclusion).
256 However, as indicated in text Christensen and Mead could result in an increase in
deference in the Tax Court. See supra notes 254-255 and accompanying text.
257 Justice Scalia has suggested that agencies will tend to tailor their pronouncements
in order to secure more deferential review. See Mead, 121 S. Ct. 2164, 2182 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). However, if the ruling is issued in connection with litigation, this may affect
the court's willingness to grant deference. See Cottage Savings Ass'n, 499 U.S. at 563 n.7
(implying that deference might be appropriate when the revenue ruling is issued after the
transaction). On the other hand, courts have granted deference to a ruling issued at the time
of litigation. See, e.g., First Chicago NBD Corp. v. Comm'r, 135 F.3d 457, 459 (7th Cir.
1998) (giving deference to a revenue ruling even though it was issued at the same time the
Service asserted the deficiency against the taxpayer). In addition, the Supreme Court has
granted Chevron deference, as distinguished from Skidmore deference, even though the
interpretation was issued as a result of litigation. See Smiley, 517 U.S. at 740.
258 See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (internal quotes omitted); see also
Connor v. Comm'r, 218 F.3d 733, 738 (7th Cir. 2000) (applying deference with regard to
the Service's interpretation of an ambiguity in the regulations).
259 See Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 121 S.Ct. at 1444-45 (indicating that the
Service's consistent position in longstanding revenue rulings as to the meaning of an
ambiguous regulation is entitled to "substantial judicial deference").
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ron, an increasing number of issues will be addressed in the regulations,

the potential for the government to dictate the outcome of litigation
through rulings that resolve ambiguities in the regulations is quite considerable-any cutback that Christensen and Mead may precipitate notwith-

standing. This expansion in the government's authority,26 though perhaps

not as problematic as in the context of regulations because rulings will not
universally enjoy the same level of deference as regulations, nevertheless

raises the same kinds of questions about the failure to provide a disinter" '
ested check on governmental bias or bureaucratic abuse.26

The Supreme Court has not offered any more concrete guidance on the
deference issue when the taxpayer invokes a ruling, but two decisions
reveal a trend in the direction of binding the government by its rulings-a
262 In Commistrend that is even more discernible in the circuit courts.
sioner of Internal Revenue v. Estate of Hubert,261 although none of the
various opinions explicitly addressed the deference issue, the three-Justice
concurring opinion predicated its rejection of the Service's argument on a
concession made in a ruling with regard to the meaning of an ambiguous
regulation.2' The two-Justice dissent did not disagree in terms of deference, but rather argued that the concurring opinion misread the scope of

260

Controlling deference possibly may be secured for a revenue ruling if a regulation

provides that the approach taken in rulings is determinative. See Estate of Harrison v.
Comm'r, 115 T.C. 161, 165-66 (2000) (intimating that a revenue ruling would be entitled
to controlling deference when the regulation provided that the ruling issued pursuant to the
regulation would govern).
261
262 See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
See Estate of Rapp v. Comm'r, 140 F.3d 1211, 1216-17 (9th Cir. 1998) (indicating
that a two-tier deference standard is appropriate for revenue rulings and that, although they
are not binding on the taxpayer, the government's ability to disavow a taxpayer friendly
ruling is limited); Estate of Kosow v. Comm'r, 45 F.3d 1524, 1528 n.4 (11th Cir. 1995)
(indicating that although revenue rulings are not binding on the courts, taxpayers may assert
them as a "shield"); Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 1994) (distinguishing one of its prior pro-government decisions on the ground that it had given deference
to a revenue ruling and now holding for the government on the ground that the ruling had
since been revoked). The Tax Court has also, on occasion, held the government to its
revenue ruling, see, e.g. Cascasde, TC Memo 2000-58 (indicating that concessions in
rulings are binding on the Service). See also Coverdale, supra note 95, at 83-84. But see
Frazier v. Comm'r, Ill T.C. 243, 248 (1998) (indicating that revenue rulings are not
bindinA on the court).
520 U.S. 93 (1997).
264See id. at 117-18.
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the concession."' Thus, when the concurring and dissenting opinions in
Hubert are read together, it appears that fives Justices may be prepared to
take the view that rulings invoked by a taxpayer are authoritative and
binding on the government 26 (at least when the ruling clarifies the meaning of an ambiguous regulation26 7).
In Schleier, the Court concluded that a concession made in a ruling
was not binding on the government because it was contrary to an unambiguous statute.268 Though not entirely clear, the negative implication is that
the Court is prepared to hold a ruling binding on the government when the
statute is ambiguous269 and the ruling adopts a reasonable construction in
light of that ambiguity.2 0 In any event, whatever one may make of
Hubert'sconcurring and dissenting opinions and Schleier'snegative implication, the Court apparently has established an outer boundary for deference and authoritativeness in this context: the government is not bound by
a ruling if it27can establish that the statute unambiguously calls for a contrary result. '
When a court concludes that the government is bound by a ruling, the
government's authority obviously is contracted. Because taxpayers rely on
265

266

See id. at 129-30.

See generally Gans et al, supra note 124, at 969 (discussing the various opinions
in Hubert, as well as the regulations proposed in response to the decision).
267 Justice Scalia made the point in his dissent that rulings that resolve an ambiguity in
a regulation are entitled to deference (see Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. at 127 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)). Accordingly, he might take a different approach in the absence of such ambigUity268 See Schleier, 515 U.S. at 336 n.8.

269 Did the majority intend to imply this? Apparently so, given that the dissent argued
that the ruling was not an unreasonable interpretation of the statute and should therefore be
viewed as binding, see id. at 345, and the majority's only response was that the ruling was
invalid because the statute called unambiguously for a contrary result. See id. at 336 n.8.
In other words, the majority's failure to argue in response that the ruling would not be
binding even if the statute were ambiguous strongly implies it would reject such an argument.
270 See Estate of McLendon v. Comm'r, 135 F.3d 1017, 1024-25 (5th Cir. 1998);
Silco, Inc. v. United States, 779 F.2d 282, 286-87 (5th Cir. 1986).
271 Notably, the Court left open the question of whether, in these circumstances, the
government would be bound by a concession contained in a regulation. See Schleier, 515
U.S. at 334. On the other hand, see United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 245-46 (1992)
(Scalia, J. concurring) (maintaining that the government does not have the authority to
reduce the impact of a tax imposed by Congress through the promulgation of a regulation
that goes beyond the clear parameters of the statute).
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rulings and because one important function that rulings serve is to facilitate
transactions by making clear in advance the tax consequences they will
generate, it is unfair"2 and inefficient to permit the government to disavow
a ruling after a taxpayer has consummated a transaction on the basis of the
ruling.273 Thus, the contraction of the government's authority, resulting
from the emerging view that rulings are authoritative and binding on the
government, is constructive. While Hubertand the negative implication in
Schleier are positive developments, the majority's unqualified assertion in
Schleier that a court must disregard any ruling that is inconsistent with an
unambiguous statute-apparently even in the face of taxpayer reliance274raises fairness and efficiency concerns. Indeed, in the aftermath of
Schleier, the Service implicitly acknowledged its discomfort with the
Court's decision to invalidate the ruling and thereby ignore the concession
it contained, thus suggesting that the Service recognizes the salutary effect
of standing behind its rulings.275
In sum, however the deference standard is formulated, revenue rulings
now enjoy more deference than they did traditionally. The resulting expansion of government authority when a pro-government ruling is reviewed deferentially is problematic. On the other hand, when a pro-taxpayer ruling receives deference precluding the government from changing
In Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 72-73 (1965), the Court addressed the
fairness issue by emphasizing that the Service had not invited reliance, but instead had
indicated that it would not necessarily adhere to a position taken in a revenue ruling.
273 See Estate of McLendon, 135 F.3d at 1024-25 & n. 13; Silco, 779 F.2d at 286;
Dixon 381 U.S. 68.
24 No argument could be made that the taxpayer in Schleier had relied on the ruling.
In arguing that the damage award he had received in 1986 should not be included in gross
income, the taxpayer cited a 1993 revenue ruling, Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61 but the
Court concluded the ruling was invalid. Obviously, the taxpayer did not rely on the ruling
at the27time of the 1986 settlement. See Schleier, 515 U.S. at 327.
See Rev. Rul. 96-65, 1996-2 C.B. 6 (revoking Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61, the
ruling that Schleier invalidated, but only with regard to transactions occurring after the
Court's decision). Although the Service's limiting of a Supreme Court decision is surprising, the Service does have the authority to make rulings (includingjudicial rulings) prospective in operation. See I.R.C. § 7805(b)(8) (2001). However, this raises the question of
whether the Service's, or the Treasury's, altering the impact of a Supreme Court decision is
constitutionally permissible. See infra note 342. Moreover, it is somewhat ironic that the
Court in Schleier concluded that a ruling cannot overturn an unambiguous statute only to
have the Service respond by overturning the Court's decision (at least in the sense that the
Service limited the decision so that it would have prospective effect only). See Schleier,
515 U.S. at 336 n.8.
272
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a position on which a taxpayer has relied, the constraint on government
authority makes sense in terms of fairness and efficiency.
PART V. A UER DEFERENCE: AMBIGUOUS REGULATIONS

The deference transformation has been extended beyond the interpretation of statutes. The way that courts police agencies that interpret their
own regulations has undergone change as well. Until recently, how deference applied in this context was somewhat unclear.2 76 However, the Supreme Court has now clarified that a type of deference analogous to Chevron-type deference is appropriate. In Auer v. Robbins,2" the Court held
that a court, when required to determine the meaning of an ambiguous
regulation, must give controlling deference to an interpretation proffered
by the8agency if it is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.

27

However, deference is not required if the interpretation does not represent the agency's considered view.2 79 For example, when the agency's
appellate counsel argues in a brief that a court should construe a regulation
in favor of the government, deference is inappropriate. 2 0 But when the
brief reflects that the proffered interpretation represents the official view
of the agency, and not simply the view of appellate counsel, the interpretation is entitled to controlling deference.2 1
276

See generallyManning, supranote 145, at 680-81 (reviewing the uncertain status
of the law regarding the deference that a court gives an agency when it proffers an interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation).
277 519 U.S. 452, 457 (1997), vacated by 519 U.S. 1145 (1997).
278 See id. at 461.
279 See id. at 462-63.
280 See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988) (refusing to
defer to an argument made by appellate counsel in a brief as to the meaning of the statute,
because it did not indicate that it represented the views of the agency). In Bowen, the
meaning of a statute, rather than a regulation, was at issue. However, the Auer Court's
citation to Bowen and the language in Bowen (as well as in Auer) suggesting that a court can
only apply deference when an agency has taken a considered position indicate that deference under Auer cannot be invoked on the basis of an argument made by appellate counsel
in a brief.
281 See Auer, 519 U.S. at 461-62 (finding the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of an
ambiguous regulation contained in an amicus brief entitled to controlling deference);
Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 121 S. Ct. at 1444-45 (giving deference to the government's interpretation of a tax regulation based on longstanding revenue rulings adopting the
same interpretation). See also Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. at 129 (entitling government's
interpretation of regulation to "considerable deference") (Scalia, J. dissenting); Connor v.
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The rationale is that, as long as the agency's interpretation is not inconsistent with the statute, any revised draft of the regulation containing
the interpretation would necessarily be valid. 2" It makes no sense, the
argument goes, to reject as invalid an interpretation that could be validated
so easily. The premise that the interpretation could in all cases be adopted
by amendment is, however, open to some question. While, under Chevron,
agencies are given great latitude to amend their regulations, this authority
may nevertheless be subject to limitations beyond the requirement that the
interpretation fall within the scope of the statute.28 3 On the other hand,
underAuer,the only limitations on the agencies' authority are the parameters of the statute under interpretation (as well as the requirement, of
course, that the regulation be ambiguous and the government's resolution
be reasonable).28 4
Two critical difficulties arise with what will presumably become
known as Auer-type deference. 28 5 First, under Auer, the problem of adversarial bias is most acute. There is little question but that the government's ability to determine objectively the most appropriate construction
of a regulation will be less than optimal if the government must make the
decision at the very moment of engaging in litigation with a taxpayer.
Second, whenever a court upholds an agency's construction under Auer,
the court implicitly applies that construction on a retroactive basis. In
other words, while an agency might be able to amend an ambiguous regulaComm'r, 218 F.3d 733, 738 (7th Cir. 2000) (granting deference to the Service's interpreta-

tion of ambiguous regulation). In Schleier, 515 U.S. at 334 n.7, the Court refused to give
deference to an interpretation of an ambiguous regulation offered by the government because the government had, in the past, interpreted the regulation differently. The Court

implied that the interpretation would have been controlling had the government been
consistent. See also U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Comm'r, 270 F.3d 1137,1139 (7th Cir.
2001) (refusing to invoke Auer deference where the government had been inconsistent and
there282
was no "sound basis" for the government's position).
See Auer, 519 U.S. at 463.
283 See supra notes 134-135 and accompanying text.
284
See Auer, 519 U.S. at 461.
285 Justice Scalia suggests that, given the combination of Auer deference and the
restrictive approach taken by the Court in Mead (relegating various kinds of interpretations
to Skidmore deference, rather than Chevron's controlling deference, even if they represent
the authoritative and deliberative view of the agency), agencies will have the incentive to
issue regulations that are not very detailed. Agencies will then issue interpretations that
resolve the ambiguities inthe regulations on a case-by-case basis, claiming that the interpretation is entitled to controlling deference under Auer. See Mead, 121 S. Ct. at 2183-84
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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tion to incorporate a favored construction, that amendment would need to
be adopted on a prospective basis if the agency did not have authority to
adopt regulations retroactively.28 6 Thus, in the case of tax regulations,
which can no longer be adopted on a retroactive basis, 287 Auer permits the
government to do indirectly what it cannot do directly.288
Another form of deference is closely related to Auer deference. When
the meaning of a statute, rather than a regulation, is at issue and the agency
argues in litigation that its interpretation should prevail, the question arises
whether courts should defer to the agency's argument. Although the Supreme Court has not definitively resolved the issue, it appears to contemplate that an agency's litigating position is entitled to deference if: (1) the
agency's interpretation represents the view of the agency (as opposed, for
example, to the view of appellate counsel); and (2) the interpretation is
supported by administrative practice.2 89
Assuming these two conditions are satisfied and, as a result, deference
is appropriate, the question then becomes what level of deference should
be applied. While further clarification of the issue is needed, the Court has
implied strongly that an agency's litigating position should be analyzed
under Skidmore. 29° Thus, in contrast to regulations (which are entitled to
2

16 SeeBowen, 488 U.S. at 208-09 (1988) (indicating that agencies do not have authorissue regulations on a retroactive basis unless the statute explicitly authorizes it).
ity to287
See I.R.C. § 7805(b) (West Supp. 2001).
288 Some commentators have suggested that, depending on one's perspective, retroactivity can be seen as creating positive or negative effects. See SHAVIRo, supra note 142, at
116-17. If one takes the view that the Treasury will use any authority it is given to act on
a retroactive basis to close down abusive transactions, then the case for retroactivity would
be compelling. See id. However, if one takes the view that the Treasury will use any such
authority in a self-interested way to maximize revenue, one would be inclined to reach the
opposite conclusion. See id. Under either view, the government's bias as an adversary
seems to argue against permitting it the authority to adopt with retroactive effect interpretations proffered in the middle of litigation.
Z89 See Bowen, 488 U.S. at 212. The Bowen Court did not elaborate as to the kind of
administrative practice that would be entitled to receive deference.
290 See id. at 212-13 (indicating that an agency litigation position would only be
entitled to deference if it were reasoned and consistently maintained). The two factors that
the Court emphasized, whether the interpretation is well reasoned and whether the agency
has been consistent, would be relevant under Skidmore but not under Chevron or Auer. See
id. See also Jewett v. Comm'r, 455 U.S. 305, 318 (2000) (indicating that the Service's
consistent interpretation of the Code is entitled to deference); Mead, 121 S. Ct. at 2177 n. 19
(2001) (refusing to grant Chevron deference in the case of a position taken by the government in its brief); Household Int'l Tax Reduction Inv. Plan v. Matz,121 S. Ct. 2545 (2001)
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Chevron- or Auer-type deference), an agency's litigating position, while
perhaps entitled to some deference, is not entitled to controlling deference.
Again, the questions of adversarial bias and retroactivity are implicated,
although they are less critical in this context because, under the Skidmore
framework, the courts have more discretion to reject an agency's litigating
position.291
PART VI. A PROPOSAL
The alteration in deference has had, and will continue to have, a very
significant impact on tax practice, as well as on other areas of law. The
Treasury's expanded regulation-writing authority under Chevron, which it
used to overturn the Supreme Court's decision in Hubert'92 and to resolve
the Peterson/Simpson issue,293 indicates that the Treasury's role is undergoing a radical revision. The Supreme Court's decision in Auer also expands the government's influence by requiring that the courts defer to
agencies' reasonable resolution of ambiguity in their regulations. At the
same time, the increased deference given revenue rulings under the
Skidmore framework 294 contributes, as well, to the changing dynamic in tax
litigation, by further strengthening the government's hand.295
Whatever view one may take of the persuasiveness of Chevron'spolitical accountability theory-and ofdeference in general-granting increased
deference to the government raises two tax-specific issues. One relates to
expertise, and the other to the government's position as an adversary in tax
litigation.
First, deference ordinarily is justified not solely on the basis of politibut also on the basis of agency expertise. 296 However,
accountability,
cal
in the tax context, the government's expertise does not have the same
importance as it does in other areas of the law. Because tax litigation often
(granting certiorari and remanding for reconsideration the level of deference owed to an
amicus brief filed by the Service on a question of statutory interpretation in light of the
Court's
29 decision in Mead).
1See, eg., Callaway v. Comm'r, 231 F.3d 106, 132 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Bowen and

litigating position).
refusing
292 to defer to the Service's
See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
293 See supra notes 72-73, 90-92 and accompanying text.
294
See supra notes 243-253 and accompanying text.
295 Revenue Rulings which construe an ambiguous regulation can become the predicate for Auer-type deference. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
296 See supra notes 100-104 and accompanying text.
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occurs in the Tax Court, which has its own substantial expertise, the danger that a decision will be either insensitive to relevant policies or the
Code's structure is greatly diminished. In other words, to the extent that
deference is driven by the concern that courts might otherwise undermine
the agencies' expertise-based decisions, deference cannot be justified in
areas of law when specialized courts are in place.
Under current law, however, the Tax Court does not have exclusive
jurisdiction over tax cases. Although much tax litigation occurs in the Tax
Court, generalistjudges having less tax expertise than the government very
frequently decide whether the government's interpretive position should be
sustained. Taxpayers have the option of litigating tax cases in the District
Court or the Court of Federal Claims,297 and the Courts of Appeals exercise
appellate jurisdiction in all tax cases29 (with regard to questions of law) on
a de novo basis.299 If this disparity in tax expertise between generalist
judges and the government could be reduced, the case for increased deference in the tax area would be much diminished.
The question of how to reform the tax litigation process has been
discussed elsewhere and is beyond the scope of this Article.3 0 Nevertheless, two basic approaches that address this disparity in expertise are briefly considered. Under both approaches, one court, such as the Tax Court,
would have exclusive jurisdiction over all tax cases.3' Where the two
approaches differ is in terms of appellate review. One approach would
create a new circuit court with jurisdiction to hear all appeals in tax matters.3 2 Under the other approach, as under current law, one of the existing
circuit courts would conduct appellate review. But, because under the

297
298

See 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (a)(1) (2001).
See I.R.C. § 7482. For a discussion of the inclination of some courts to defer to the

Tax Court on questions of law, see David F. Shores, Deferential Review of Tax Court
Decisions:
Dobson Revisited, 49 TAX LAW. 629 (1996).
299
See Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 289-91 (1960).
300 See, e.g., Erwin N. Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 HARv. L.
REv. 1153 (1944); Erwin N. Griswold, Speech: Is the Tax Law Going to Seed?, 11 AM. J.
TAX POL'Y 1, 7 (1994). See also William D. Popkin, Why a Court of Tax Appeals is So
Elusive, 47 TAx NoTEs 1101 (May 28, 1990).
301 The court would need to resolve questions about the right to a jury and the need to
pay in advance.
302 For a general discussion, see Steve R. Johnson, The Phoenix and the Perilsof the
Second Best: Why HeightenedAppellate Deference to Tax Court Decisionsis Undesirable,
77 OR. L. REv. 235 (1998); Shores, supra note 298.
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latter approach, generalist judges would review the work product of
specialists-the lower court judges and tax administrators-limiting the
scope of appellate review would be appropriate (otherwise, the disparity in
expertise produced under current law would continue). Such a limitation
on the scope of review could be achieved by requiring that the lower
court's decision receive deference on questions of law as well as fact,
making reversal on legal questions appropriate only where the ruling is
unreasonable.3 °3
Not only would these two approaches ameliorate the disparity-inexpertise problem, thereby weakening the case for increased deference,
they also would create a salutary by-product. Under either approach,
taxpayers would have less opportunity to engage in forum shopping; indeed, the former approach would completely eliminate forum shopping. In
addition, the former approach would eliminate, and the latter approach
diminish, the potential for non-uniform application of the law inherent in
the current system (i.e., disagreements between the Tax Court and the
305
circuit courts 3 0 and disagreements among the various circuit courts).
Second, the case for applying increased deference in the tax context is
further undercut by another important distinction between tax and some
other agency-administered areas of law. In tax cases, the government is the
taxpayer's adversary. As the government's response to its defeat in
Simpson suggests, adversarial bias is not easily put aside.3 Therefore,
although the government's litigation with a particular taxpayer has ended,
the views formulated in the litigation take on a life of their own. In contrast, in other areas of law when the government is not a litigant and not
suffering the burden of adversarial bias, the government can be trusted to
303

This limitation appears somewhat novel, but Congress adopted the limitation in the

context of habeas corpus. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399 (2000) (interpreting
the new criminal statutes' requirement that relief only be granted if the decision invalidated
"an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law . .. "). See generally,
Shores, supra note 298 (discussing the deference given to the Tax Court by the appellate

courts),

3U4 See, e.g., Golsen v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 742, 756-57 (1970) (indicating that the Tax
Court will follow circuit court precedent when appeal is to be taken to that circuit).
305 Although de novo review ordinarily tends to unify precedent (see Cooper Indus.,
Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1678, 1682-83 (2001) (holding the
appropriate standard of review for determining whether punitive damage award exceeds
constitutional limits is de novo because, in part, such review will unify precedent)) the
limitation
30 6 on appellate review suggested in the text would create more uniformity.
See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
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make interpretive decisions that are not influenced by self-interest.
Consider the Supreme Court's treatment of the regulation in Smiley." 7
The Court gave controlling (Chevron) deference to a regulation issued by
the Comptroller of the Currency one hundred years after the enactment of
the underlying statute and during the litigation that led to the Court's
decision.3"' Unlike the role the Treasury plays in the tax area, the Comptroller of the Currency was not a party to the litigation and, therefore, had
no direct interest in its outcome.30 9 If the government were to issue a
regulation resolving an issue in a pending tax litigation, permitting such a
resolution to be binding under Chevron on the taxpayer would seem unjust.
Indeed, Congress acknowledged as much by amending Code section
7805(b) in 1996 to eliminate the Treasury's authority to issue regulations
on a retroactive basis.3"0 As a result of the amendment, the government is
no longer permitted to determine the outcome of pending tax litigation by
regulation. 3 ' Nevertheless, subject to the proviso that the Treasury make
any new regulation prospective, it remains free in many instances to rewrite the outcome of a decision it loses, as it did in the aftermath of its
defeat in Simpson and Hubert.3" 2 And, under Chevron, the government's
adversarial bias is irrelevant in determining the validity of such a regulation. Moreover, Smiley suggests that, despite any statutory limitation on an
agency's ability to make regulations retroactive, it would be inappropriate
for a court interpreting a statute to give no deference to a regulation simply
because it was issued after the consummation of the transaction under
inquiry (though the Court presumably contemplates less than controlling
313
deference in this context).
30 7

See supra notes 127-130 and accompanying text.
517 U.S. at 740-41.
309 See id. at 739 (noting that the deference that Courts give to agencies extends to the
Comptroller of the Currency).
10 See I.R.C. § 7805 (b) (Supp. 2001); Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104168, § 1101, 110 Stat. 1452, 1468-69 (1996). Although one might argue in favor of retroactivity on the ground that it would deter taxpayer abuse, see Shaviro, supra note 142,
remedies more narrowly tailored to such abuse could be fashioned without creating the
potential for government abuse inherent in a general rule of retroactivity. See, e.g., Gunn,
supra note 5, at 162-63 (suggesting legislation that would permit courts to disregard an
abusive transaction even if it literally satisfied the terms of the Code).
311 Retroactive regulations continue to be permissible if issued within eighteen months
of the enactment of the underlying statute. See I.R.C. § 7805 (b)(2) (Supp. 2001).
312 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
313
See Smiley, 517 U.S. at 744 n.3. But see Peterson, 78 F.3d at 800 (intimating that
30 8 SeeSmiley,
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Even more disconcerting, Auer requires the court to defer to an
agency's interpretation when an ambiguous regulation is at issue. 3 4 This
has the effect of permitting the government to prevail whenever the litigation revolves around an ambiguous regulation-a common occurrence in
the tax area. In contrast, when the government is not a party to the litigation but merely files an amicus brief offering its interpretation, Auer deference is obviously less troubling. Auer, in effect, permits the government
to make its newly announced position applicable on a retroactive basis, in
violation of the spirit of the 1996 amendment to section 7805(b). 3 5 Not
only does Auer contemplate that interpretations will be binding when
issued after the transaction is consummated, it even contemplates that the
interpretations will be binding when issued during the process of litigating
the transaction's tax consequences. Permitting the government to declare
its own victory when it appears as a party in the litigation undermines the
effectiveness of the courts as a check on bureaucratic abuse and is fundamentally unfair.
In short, given the government's role in tax litigation, a compelling
case can be made for reducing the level of deference it enjoys in tax matters. And should the disparity-in-expertise issue be resolved in one of the
ways suggested, the case for reducing deference would become even stronger. The question, therefore, is how deference might be ratcheted downward in the tax area.31 6
In terms of regulations, whether interpretive or legislative, it would
seem that Skidmore's framework would be preferable over Chevron 's.
Under Skidmore the court is permitted to consider a variety of factors in
determining the validity of an agency interpretation,1 7 unlike the binding
deference that Chevron requires.318 Thus, for example, a regulation issued

disregarding a post-transaction regulation when the taxpayers rely on their own justifiable
interpretation of the statute might be appropriate).
14 See supra notes 276-284 and accompanying text.
315 See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
316
If Chevron deference were constitutionally mandatory, as some have suggested, see,
e.g., Mead, 121 S. Ct. at 2179 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting), any proposal that would
ratchet it down obviously would be impermissible. As the majority in Mead makes clear,
however, the prevailing view is that the applicability of Chevron turns on Congress' intent.
See id. at 2171-74; see also Merrill & Hickman supra note 103, at 836.
317 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
318 Under Skidmore, the legislative character of a regulation might favor deference, but
not the kind of controlling deference Chevron requires.
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long after the statute's enactment, or one having an adversarial origin,
might be of questionable validity under Skidmore,"9 although as Smiley
indicates, such considerations are irrelevant under Chevron.3 2 Or perhaps,
the new generation-skipping regulations might be vulnerable under
Skidmore because of Congress' ratification of the earlier regulation, even
if it is assumed that the standard for applying the reenactment doctrine
against the government has not been satisfied.
One could argue that, as an alternative to adopting the Skidmore framework, tax regulations should receive no deference. However, the difficulty
with this approach is that the Code is complex and, as a consequence, there
is a need for legislative-type rules that a court cannot easily supply. Given
this institutional limitation, and given that Skidmore should provide sufficient protection against bureaucratic abuse, the no-deference alternative is
not particularly appealing.32 ' Thus, Congress should enact legislation
adopting the Skidmore framework as the controlling standard for evaluating tax regulations.
The deference required under Auer is perhaps most pernicious. The
consequences of adversarial bias are at their worst in this context because
the courts are, in essence, precluded from exercising any check on what
amounts to the government's declaration of victory by retroactive regulation. Therefore, Congress should overrule Auer, eliminating all deference
for the interpretations of ambiguous tax regulations proffered by the government during litigation.322 Similarly, Congress should overrule Smiley's
conclusion that the courts must consult regulations even where issued after
agency does not
the transaction has been consummated and even if3 the
23
retroactively.
regulations
issue
to
have the authority
319

320
321

See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
See Smiley, 517 U.S. at 740.
See Merrill, supra note 151, at 10 19-20 (suggesting that the validity of all regula-

tions, tax and nontax alike, should be tested by their persuasiveness).
22See Manning, supra note 145, at 687 (arguing that applying controlling deference
in this context is inappropriate and instead, the government's interpretation of its ambiguous
should only receive Skidmore-type deference).
regulations
323
See Kyle D. Logue, Tax Transitions,OpportunisticRetroactivity, and the Benefits
of Government Precommitment, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1129, 1131 (1996) (arguing that if the
government is permitted opportunistically to alter its position on a retroactive basis, inefficiency will result); Kyle D. Logue, If Taxpayers Can'tBe Fooled,Maybe Congress Can: A
Public Choice Perspectiveon the Tax Transition Debate, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 1507 (2000).
But see Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis ofLegal Transitions,99 HARV. L. REV. 509,
551-52 (1986) (arguing in favor of retroactivity because of efficiency); Michael J. Graetz,
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As indicated, while it appears that the government's litigation position
regarding an ambiguous Code section's meaning does not receive as much
deference as its interpretation of an ambiguous regulation,32 4 the same
concerns about adversarial bias and retroactivity are implicated. 32" Any
deference-altering legislation should, therefore, also deny the government
deference for its interpretations of ambiguous Code sections offered during
litigation.326
Revenue rulings are more troubling. On the one hand, treating them
differently from regulations is difficult to justify.3" After all, both revenue
rulings and regulations are the product of the government's careful deliberation.32 8 It is, of course, true that regulations, unlike rulings, are issued
only after the public has been given an opportunity for comment.3 29 Nevertheless, this distinction is not a satisfactory basis for requiring deference in
one case but not in the other.330 While the public-comment process entails
some additional deliberation, the difference in the level of deliberation is
not sufficiently substantial to warrant the discrimination. Furthermore, the
government continues to consider its rulings after issuing them, qualifying,
modifying, or revoking them based on the public's adverse reaction. This
post-issuance deliberation of rulings appears roughly equivalent to the
deliberation that occurs in response to the pre-issuance public comment in

Legal Transitions:The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV.
47, 87 (1977).
See Jewett v. Comm'r, 455 U.S. 305, 318 (1982) (indicating that the deference
owed to the Commissioner's consistent construction of a regulation is even more forceful
than the deference owed in the case of a Code section).
325 For a discussion of deference regarding the government's litigation position,
see
supranote 289 and accompanying text.
326 The denial of deference in the case of an ambiguous Code section or
regulation
should not create much potential for court-created taxpayer windfalls. Courts will presumably resolve any ambiguity to avoid such an outcome. See Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 220 (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (arguing that, in the face of an ambiguous Code section, courts should strive
to avoid a construction that would produce an inappropriate taxpayer victory).
327 For a review of the process, see generally Galler, supra note 108.
328 Even under Skidmore, an interpretation is entitled to greater weight if it is the
product
of the agency's thorough and careful deliberation. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
329
See, e.g., First Chicago NBD Corp. v. Comm'r, 135 F.3d 457,459 (7th Cir. 2000)
(indicating that interpretive rules do not require notice and opportunity for public comment3° See Mead, 121 S. Ct. at 2173 (indicating
that the applicability of Chevron should
not turn on whether notice and comment is required or provided).
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the context of regulations.33 '
On the other hand, rulings often are issued long after the enactment of
the statute they interpret and, sometimes in anticipation of, during, or in
the aftermath of the government's litigation with a taxpayer.33 2 This practice, together with the government's direct interest in the outcome of tax
litigation and the adversarial bias thereby engendered, weigh against
deference---even Skidmore deference-for revenue rulings. Eliminating
such deference would strengthen the courts' authority to check bureaucratic abuse arising from a desire to win.
The danger in taking this kind of bifurcated approach (Skidmore deference for regulations and no deference for rulings), not unlike the bifurcation effected under current law (Chevron deference for regulations and,
apparently, Skidmore deference for rulings), is that it may simply result in
the government's incorporating more interpretations in amendments to the
regulations, rather than in rulings, in order to secure deferential review.
The response is twofold. First, the suggested bifurcation will not create
any more incentive for the government to act opportunistically than it has
under the current law's bifurcation. Second, to the extent that the government begins to incorporate its interpretations opportunistically in regulations, this could lead to less, or even no, deference for such regulations
under Skidmore. On balance, reverting to the traditional view that revenue
rulings are not entitled to deference is preferable.333
The final question is whether the government should be able to argue
in litigation that a taxpayer-friendly ruling or regulation should be denied
effect. The issue can arise in either of two ways: (1) where the government
argues that the ruling or regulation is invalid because it is inconsistent with
the statute, or (2) where the government argues that, although the ruling or
regulation is not invalid, it should nevertheless be rejected in favor of a

331

Under Justice Scalia's approach, courts presumably would treat revenue rulings as

the equivalent of regulations and therefore receive the same level of deference, given that
the rulings represent the government's official position. See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 589
(Scalia, J., concurring) (maintaining that Chevron deference should apply to an opinion
letter issued by an agency if it represents the agency's official position); Mead, 121 S. Ct.
at 2177 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (reiterating the position he held in Christensen).
332 See, e.g., First Chicago NBD Corp., 135 F.3d at 459 (entitling a revenue ruling

deference although issued in connection with the case under inquiry).
333 See Coverdale,supra note 99, at 82-83; Galler, supranote 108, at 1068-73 (arguing
that revenue rulings should receive no deference).
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newly proffered construction of the statute. In either case, as a matter of
fairness, taxpayers who rely on such rulings or regulations should not face
the possibility that the government will disavow them.334
Efficiency concerns also favor the taxpayer. The uncertainty created
by permitting the government to disavow its own rulings and regulations
unquestionably impedes planning and makes transactions more difficult to
consummate.3 35 Indeed, where the government disavows a ruling or regulation in court after the taxpayer consummates a transaction on the basis of
it, the government is, in effect, making its new position operative on a
retroactive basis-in violation of the spirit of the 1996 amendment to Code
section 7805(b).336
Thus, those decisions that have precluded the government from disavowing its interpretation of an ambiguous statute are a welcome development. 337 Legislation should be enacted confirming the validity of such
corrective decisions and extending their reach so that the government is
denied the authority to argue against an outstanding interpretation even
when the government claims that the statute unambiguously renders the
interpretation invalid.
As indicated, in Schleier,33 8 the Supreme Court concluded that courts
are required to invalidate a revenue ruling if the ruling is found to be contrary to the plain meaning of a Code section at issue. 339 Although the
taxpayer in Schleier had not consummated the transaction on the basis of
the ruling (it was issued after the taxpayer had completed the transaction),340 the government nevertheless felt obliged to use its authority under
Code section 7805(b)(8) to limit the Court's decision so that the declaration of the ruling's invalidity would have prospective effect only (i.e.,
would not become effective until the date of the Court's decision).3 4'
However, the government's sensitivity to the plight of taxpayers who
334 See, e.g., I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. 2271, 2288 (2001) (indicating
that,
"[e]lementary considerations of fairness" dictate that people should be able to determine the
consequences of their actions before taking them).
335 See Jewett, 455 U.S. at 305.
336
See supra notes 287, 315 and accompanying text.
337 See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
338
See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
339
See Schleier, 515 U.S. at 336 n.8.
340 See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
341 See Rev. Rul. 96-65, 1996-2 C.B. 6; see also supra note 275 and accompanying

WINTER 2002

Deference and the End of Tax Practice 797

otherwise would have been adversely affected by the decision is not sufficiently reassuring to taxpayers in general. In other cases, the government
may well prevail in litigation by arguing against one of its rulings and then
refusing to limit the decision's retroactive effect.
In Schleier, the Court also raised, but did not answer, the question of
whether a taxpayer-friendly regulation that is found to be invalid should
similarly be disregarded.342 However, Justice Scalia has indicated that
such a regulation cannot constitutionally be permitted to have effect.343
Under Justice Scalia's view, the Constitution vests the power to enact
legislation in Congress, and therefore precludes an agency such as the
Treasury from denying a statute the effect Congress intended. 3"
Interestingly, the government's decision to limit the Schleier Court's
invalidation of the revenue ruling by invoking its authority under Code
section 7805(b)(8)" 5 might raise constitutional questions as well. Once the
Court declared that the ruling was contrary to the clear meaning of the
statute, its conclusion became binding for all outstanding cases.3' 6 In the
absence of new legislation, it would be impermissible for the executive
342 See Schleier, 515 U.S. at 334.
343 See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 245-46 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)

(arguing that agencies cannot rewrite legislation, and suggesting that sympathy for a taxpayer in these circumstances could be demonstrated by reducing any penalty otherwise
applicable). See also Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Comm'r, 297 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1936)
(disregarding an invalid regulation as a nullity, though not explicitly predicating its decision
on constitutional
grounds).
3
4 Justice Scalia's argument is analogous to the traditional notion that the government
cannot be estopped by the act of an agent. Indeed, in Burke, 504 U.S. at 246 (Scalia, J.,
concurring), Justice Scalia cited Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S.
414, 427-28 (1990) (holding that estopping the government would be unconstitutional).
345 In making the Schleier holding prospective, the government implicitly utilized its
authority under this provision, which allows it to limit the effect of a ruling, including a
judicial ruling, so that it will have prospective effect only.
346 See Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993) (indicating
that
Court decisions with respect to questions of federal law are retroactively applicable to
pending cases); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 214 (1995) (indicating that
the Court had applied its decision construing a statute on a retroactive basis in Lampf,
Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991)). For a different
approach in the habeas corpus setting, see Teague v. Lane, 490 U.S. 1031 (1989) (applying
a different rule in the habeas corpus context on the rationale that, once a criminal conviction
becomes final, the case is no longer pending and, therefore, any new rule subsequently
announced by the Court cannot be invoked); Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S.
749, 758 (1995) (explaining that the Teague rule is a reflection of the fact that the criminal
conviction becomes final before the habeas corpus proceeding is brought).
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branch to alter or suspend the Court's decision. 347 Indeed, even with regard to new cases, any agency interpretation that is contrary to the clear
meaning of the statute, as found by the Court, cannot be valid.34 Therefore, it would appear that Code section 7805(b)(8) may be unconstitutionally applied whenever, as in the aftermath of Schleier, the government
seeks to revive a ruling declared invalid by the courts. 9 As a practical
matter where the government revives a taxpayer-friendly ruling, any constitutional defect might well go unaddressed given the fact that no taxpayer
decision to
is aggrieved.350 The lack of any challenge to the government's
35
make the Schleier holding prospective reflects this reality. '
As indicated, if the courts can resolve constitutional questions, fairness
and efficiency would dictate that the government not be permitted to disavow its rulings or regulations. Once the government determines that
adhering to its original position is no longer appropriate, the government
should be required to effect any modification by revoking the ruling or
347 The Court has made clear that Congress has the authority to enact legislation

overturning the Court's interpretation of a statute on a retroactive basis without violating the
separation ofpowers. See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 226-27 (indicating that Congress can overturn
courts' decision for all outstanding cases as long as it does not reverse the outcome in any
particular case that has reached final judgment).
348 See supra notes 120-121.
349 But see Benjamin J. Cohen & Catherine A. Harrington, Is the InternalRevenue
Service BoundBy Its Own Regulations and Rulings?, 51 TAx LAW. 675, 704 (1998) (arguing that the government should be bound by an invalid regulation).
350 See Alison H. Eaton, Comment, Can the IRS Overrule the Supreme Court?,
45
EMORY L.J. 987 (1996) (discussing the standing question in this context).
351 In contrast, when the Court merely determines the best construction of an ambiguous statute, the situation is not the same. In this context, there is presumably no constitutional impediment to a post-decision regulation or ruling that overturns the Court's decision,
although such a post-decision ruling or regulation arguably would undermine the Court's
statutory-interpretation function and therefore constitute a violation of the separation of
powers (see French v. Miller, 530 U.S. 327, 341 (2000) (indicating that one branch cannot
encroach on the "central prerogatives" of another branch); Plaut,514 U.S. at 218 (citing
Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409, 1 L. Ed. 436 (1792), for the proposition that the executive
branch cannot be given the authority to review decisions issued by the judicial branch)).
The three-Justice concurring opinion in Estate ofHubert, 520 U.S. at 122 (1997), explicitly
invited the government to overturn the Court's decision by regulation (though it should be
noted that, in Hubert, the Court had construed a ruling and a regulation, not the statute).
See supranotes 122-125,263-267 and accompanying text. In the case of statutory ambiguity, the government may be permitted constitutionally to issue a ruling that rejects the
Court's interpretation and makes it applicable for pending, as well as new, cases (though the
Treasury could only act on a prospective basis by regulation given Code section 7805(b)).
But see supra notes 120-121 and accompanying text.
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regulation on a prospective basis. The government should not be permitted
to leave a ruling or regulation intact and then ask the court to invalidate it.
Thus, in policy terms, legislation denying retroactive effect to a court
decision declaring a taxpayer-friendly ruling or regulation invalid would be
salutary. 52
The question then becomes whether-and if so, how-legislation
accomplishing this objective could be fashioned on a constitutionally
sound basis. One must consider two constitutional constraints. First, as
indicated, the Supreme Court has concluded that the federal judiciary is
constitutionally required to issue decisions on a retroactive basis.353 Therefore, any decision determining the meaning of a statute becomes binding
upon all pending and future cases, as well as the case under consideration." 4 In adopting this approach, the Court has emphasized two rationales: the inappropriateness of discriminating among similarly situated
litigants;3. 5 and the institutional limitations inherent in the judicial function
that require court decisions, unlike legislative decisions, to be forged in the
concrete context of the pending case and all possible outstanding cases. 6
Second, the executive branch cannot constitutionally be given the authority
to displace the judicially determined clear meaning of a statute. 57
Given the first constraint, whether legislation could preclude the courts
from giving retroactive effect to a decision overruling an agency interpretaDrafters of such legislation consideration would need to consider the kind of
situation that arose in Schleier. As indicated, in Schleier, the revenue ruling invalidated by
the Court had been issued after the taxpayer had consummated the transaction. Given the
lack of taxpayer reliance in this context, one might conclude that applying a court decision
that invalidates a taxpayer-friendly ruling or regulation to a taxpayer like Schleieris appropriate. Nevertheless, even in the absence of taxpayer reliance, a taxpayer's expectation that
a friendly ruling will not be disavowed seems necessary to be taken into account. Therefore,
although the issue is a close one, the legislation should preclude the government from
disavowing a ruling or regulation regardless of whether it was issued before or after the
transaction. It should be noted that, even under current law, the government cannot disavow a taxpayer-friendly revenue ruling or regulation with impunity. Should the ruling or
regulation be upheld in the courts, the government could become responsible for the taxpayer's legal fees. See I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B)(ii). And if the government prevails in the
courts, the ruling or regulation maybe viewed as constituting sufficiently substantial authority so as to eliminate the substantial-understatement penalty. See I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(i).
353 See supra note 346.
354
See id.
311 See Harper, 509 U.S. at 97 (1993).
356 See id. at 106-10 (Scalia, J., concurring).
357
See supra notes 120-121.
352
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tion is questionable. Nevertheless, the concern about discrimination does
not seem insurmountable. After all, it is not invidious or unreasonable to
distinguish between taxpayers who engage in a transaction before a ruling
or regulation is declared invalid from those who do so after the courts
decide the issue. Although the institutional-limitation rationale is somewhat more troubling, one can make a compelling argument that it should
yield in order to avoid the harshness of applying a newly declared interpre-

tation that is inconsistent with a ruling or regulation on which the taxpayer
has relied. However, the second constraint presents a more formidable

obstacle. That Congress could constitutionally mandate that an agency's
misinterpretation be binding during the period prior to a court's decision
declaring it invalid is doubtful (unless new legislation were enacted after
the court's decision making the invalidated interpretation valid on a retroactive basis35 ). Thus, any legislation directing that agencies only give
prospective effect to a court decision declaring a ruling or regulation invalid likely would not be sustained.
If, on the other hand, legislation were drafted to deny the Treasury
funds to maintain any litigation designed to produce a result inconsistent
with an outstanding ruling or regulation, the Treasury would not be placed
in the position of rewriting the statute, but simply precluded from seeking
ajudicial interpretation contrary to its own outstanding interpretation. And
if the legislation also denied the Treasury the authority to issue or revoke
rulings or regulations on a retroactive basis,359 it would no longer be possi
358

Such legislation would not violate the separation of powers. See Eaton, supra note

350, at 987.
359 Under prior law, the Treasury clearly had the authority to revoke a regulation
on a
retroactive basis, subject to an abuse-of-discretion standard,(see Cohen & Harrington, supra
note 349, at 676), but the 1996 amendment to Code section 7805(b) may have eliminated
this authority. See Act of July 30, 1996 Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452, 1468 (1996).
The section, as amended, makes clear that, generally the Treasury has no authority to issue
regulations on a retroactive basis, but the section does not affirmatively address the question
of the Treasury's authority to revoke a regulation retroactively. Nevertheless, the better
reading of the current version of the section is that the Treasury no longer has the authority
to revoke a regulation retroactively, for the portion of the section now authorizing revocation on a retroactive basis (subsection (b)(8)) deals, unlike its predecessor, only with rulings. See Cohen & Harrington, supra note 349, at 702 (arguing the better view is that the
Treasury lacks authority to revoke regulations retroactively). However, this would not
preclude the Treasury from maintaining that a regulation is invalid because it is inconsistent
with the Code and that it should therefore be denied effect with regard to all pending cases.
See Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Comm'r, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936) (holding that an
invalid regulation is a nullity). But see Cohen & Harrington, supra note 349, at 704 (argu-
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ble, as a practical matter, for a court to declare a taxpayer-friendly ruling
or regulation invalid. Because this legislative proposal would neither
authorize the Treasury to nullify the courts' interpretation of a statute nor

interfere with the requirement inherent in the judiciary's function that
courts make decisions on a retroactive basis, it would presumably survive
constitutional analysis.3"
Nevertheless, other objections might be made to this proposal. First,
it might be argued that the proposal seeks to achieve through indirect
means what could not be achieved directly. In other words, because Congress cannot authorize an agency to rewrite a statute, an agency should not
be permitted to accomplish that objective indirectly through the use of its
appropriations power. Second, an objection might be made that the executive branch is charged with the responsibility of faithfully executing the
laws and Congress cannot, having enacted a statute, deny the executive
branch the funds to enforce it.36' Although not entirely free from doubt,
the answer to these objections would appear to be that Congress ought to
be able to qualify the rights and obligations that it creates.362 So, for example, if Congress were to determine that the Service should no longer audit
income tax returns, it should be able to refuse to appropriate funds for this
purpose without repealing the Code.363 And if Congress could create such

ing that the 1996 amendment to Code section 7805 overrules Manhattan Gen. Equip.).
360 The Service recently fashioned its own procedure to bypass, in effect, a court
decision that had disregarded a taxpayer-friendly revenue ruling. See Chief Counsel Notice,
CC-2001-019 (March 22, 2001) (directing IRS counsel not to make arguments based on a
Ninth Circuit decision that was contrary to an earlier revenue ruling, and directing that
administrative settlements and refunds be effectuated where possible in those cases that
would be appealable to the Ninth Circuit).
361 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
362
Cf Train v. City of N.Y., 420 U.S. 35 (1975) (implying that Congress could constitutionally give the president the discretion to decline to spend legislatively appropriated
funds); Clinton v. City of N.Y., 524 U.S. 417, 468-9 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (reading
Train as implying the same). But see Bean v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms,
234 F.3d 234, 239 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 70 U.S.L.W. 3373 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2002)
(No. 01-704) (indicating that legislation denying funding to an agency would be unconstitutional363if it eviscerated a statutory right otherwise left intact).
See Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Babbitt, 73 F.3d 867, 871-72 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that,
although Congress had not repealed the substantive law, its subsequent enactment of legislation cutting off funding prevented the agency from carrying out the substantive provision).
But see Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178, 1188 n.14 (10th Cir. 1999) (disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit in EnvironmentalDefense Center and indicating that legislation
that denies funding should be viewed as a modification to the substantive law). Perhaps
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a substantial impediment to the Code's enforcement, why should it be
precluded from imposing the more limited constraint on enforcement of
denying the government funds to seek a court decision that is contrary to
an outstanding ruling or regulation?3" Thus, it would appear that there is
no constitutional impediment to legislation that would deny the government funds necessary to maintain litigation seeking an outcome contrary to
an outstanding ruling or regulation.
CONCLUSION

The transformation in deference has radically altered the role of the
government in tax litigation. The government's declaration of victory by
regulation in the Peterson/Simpson conflict, rather than following the
traditional route of continuing to litigate, instantiates the government's
enhanced authority. Given its bias as an adversary and the corresponding
need for a disinterested check on bureaucratic abuse, a strong case can be
made for reducing the level of deference the government enjoys in the tax
context. The reduction should be made on an across-the-board basis. That
is, regulations should no longer receive Chevron deference. Instead, courts
should analyze their validity under the Skidmore framework. In the case of
ambiguous regulations, a construction proffered by the government should
receive no deference. Nor should the government enjoy any deference for
a position it takes with regard to an ambiguous Code section during litigarelying on Environmental Defense Center, the Bush administration recently proposed
legislation that would deny funding to the Fish and Wildlife Service so that it would be
unable to carry out new court orders issued under the substantive provisions of the governing law, which will not be amended. See Douglas Jehl, MoratoriumAsked on Suits that
Seek to Protect Species, N.Y. TIMES, April 12, 2001, at Al. For a suggestion that the
substantive law should be modified, rather than simply denying the agency the funding
necessary to implement it, see Bruce Babbitt, Bush Isn't All Wrong About the Endangered
Species
3 Act, N.Y. TIMES, April 15, 2001, Section 4, at 11.
6 In Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001), the Court struck down
on
First Amendment grounds a restriction on the ability of private attorneys funded by the
government to raise certain legal arguments. See id. at 549. In doing so, the Court emphasized that separation-of-powers questions are implicated when Congress seeks to limit the
types of arguments that can be made in court. See id. at 536. Presumably, however, such
separation-of-powers concerns would not be present if the argument-limiting legislation is
aimed at government, rather than private, attorneys. The Court made clear that, in the case
of a "government speaker," Congress could constitutionally circumscribe the message. See
id. at 548. The four-Justice dissent, moreover, perceived no separation-of-powers deficiency in a decision by Congress to fund certain kinds of legal arguments but not others
(indicating that such legislation, whether aimed at a private or government speaker, would
not interfere inappropriately with the judicial branch). See id. at 559 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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tion. Lastly, deference should be denied revenue rulings as well. On the
other hand, once the government has issued a taxpayer-friendly ruling (or
regulation), fairness and efficiency require that it not be revoked retroactively. Thus, the government should not be permitted to pursue a position
in litigation designed to produce an outcome contrary to one of its outstanding interpretations.

